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420 W. Washington
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Facsimile: (208) 384-0442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
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Case No.

1

Plaintiff,

)

VS.
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT

1
1
1
1

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Locsha Falls, L.L.C. ("Lochsa Falls"), by and through its
attorney of record, Brian F. McColl of the firm Wilson McColl & Rasmussen and complains and
alleges as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Locsha Falls is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of

business located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho.

2.

The Defendant Idaho Transportation Board is a state governmental entity.

3.

This matter is properly brought before the District Courl pursuant to Idaho Code 5

1-705. All compensatory damages due and owing to Plaintiff are believed to be in excess of the

Complaint - 1
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statutory Magistrate court's jurisdictional amount under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
82(c)(2)(A).
FACTS

4.

Plaintiff is the developer of Lochsa Falls Subdivision in Meridian, Idaho.

5.

The plat of the subdivision, which was approved by the City of Meridian, called

for an internal collector street intersecting with Chinden Boulevard, a state highway.
6.

In order to connect with Chinden Boulevard the Idaho Transportation Department

("ITD") required Lochsa Falls to obtain an encroachment permit, pursuant to a regulation found
at IDAPA 39.03.42.200. IDAPA 39.03.42.700 provides that persons seeking encroachment
permits may be charged application fees based on the Department's "cost to produce the permit
and administer the program."

The regulation goes on to provide that "In addition to the

application fee, the Department may require payment of costs associated with the following

...

Construction of highway modifications or improvements, including but not limited to signals,
illumination, signs, pavement markings, delineation, guardrail and culverts."
7.

ITD conditioned receipt of Plaintiffs encroachment permit on Plaintiff bonding

for, and ultimately constructing a traffic signal.
8.

The Encroachment Permit was issued by the Idaho Transportation Department on

or about February 24,2005.
9.

Construction by Lochsa Falls of the traffic signal was completed by Plaintiff at a

cost of $1 76,986.00.
10.

The intersection and traffic signal on Chinden Boulevard serves the general public

and also services Silver Leaf Subdivision, a subdivision directly west of Lochsa Falls
Subdivision. A study conducted by Washington Group International found that Lochsa Falls
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would contribute 9.6% of the total traffic at the new intersection. Silver Leaf would contribute
17.5% to the total traffic. Background traffic was to contribute 72.9% of the total traffic at the
intersection.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
DISGUISED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX
11.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9 as if set

forth in full herein.
12.

Defendant's purpose in enacting IDAPA 39.03.42.700.03(e) and in imposing the

condition that the Plaintiff construct a traffic signal was in effect to raise revenue for the State by
defraying the state's expenses in constructing and maintaining the state highways, including the
cost of fbmishing, erecting and maintaining traffic signals on those highways.
13.

The condition imposed by the Idaho Transportation Board that the Plaintiff

construct the traffic signal was a tax.
14.

The Idaho Legislature has not given the Idaho Transportation Board the power to

impose taxes. The tax imposed by the Idaho Transportation Board is invalid in the absence of
such enabling legislation.
15.

The tax imposed by the Idaho Transportation Board on the Plaintiff also violates

the Idaho Constitution's "uniformity" requirement as others falling within the same classification
as Plaintiff were not required to contribute to its expense.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION
16.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 15 as if set

forth in full herein.
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Defendant required Plaintiff to expend its own funds to construct a traffic signal

17.

on Chinden Boulevard.
18.

The Plaintiffs money was thereby taken to further a public purpose.

19.

The imposition of the condition that Plaintiff construct the traffic signal at its own

expense was a taking of property without just compensation in violation of article I, section 14 of
the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
20.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 18 as if set

forth in full herein.
21.

Assuming for argument sake that the fee imposed was an exercise of the police

power and not an exercise of the power of taxation, the regulation at issue is arbitrary and
capricious,
The tax andlor fee was imposed only on Plaintiff and not on others who were

22.

similarly impacting transportation.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1.

For compensatory damages in the amount of $176,986.00.

2.

For its attorneys fees and costs incurred in bringing this action; and

3.

For such other and further relief as to the Court seems just
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DATED this&

2 4
of

&,c~W~
,2006.
WILSON & McCOLL
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN J. SCHUSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #3453
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
\

Plaintiff,

1
)

-VS-

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

1
1

Case No. CV-OC-0616178
ANSWER

)
)

1
)

The Defendant, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, ("State") by and
through its attorneys of record, Steven J. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, hereby answers the

Complaint in the above-entitled matter as follows:
ANSWER TO COMPLA.INT
1.

The State denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not specifically

admitted herein.

8

ANSWER -1

2.

The State admits Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

3.

With respect to Paragraph 3 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the State admits that the

District Court has jurisdiction over matters as set forth in Idaho Code 5 1-705, but specifically denies
that the Plaintiffs have a cause of action against the State in the above-captioned matter. The State
also specifically denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, and is without
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of any amount of alleged
damages on behalf of the Plaintiff and therefore denies the same.
4.

The State admits Paragraph 4 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

5.

The State is without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or

falsity of Paragraph 5 of the Plaintiffs Complaint and therefore denies the same.

6.

With respect to the first sentence of Paragraph 6 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the

State admits that a permit is required for an encroachment onto the right-of-way of a State highway,
that IDAPA 39.03.42, the Rules Governing Highway Right-of-way Encroachments on State
Rights-of-Way, control the issuance of such permits, and that the Plaintiff was required to obtain

such a permit because of the fact that it wished to build a new approach onto the State owned rightof-way. With respect to sentences 2 and 3 of Paragraph 6 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the State
admits that the quoted language is an accurate quotation of a portion of IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01 and
39.03.42.200.03, respectively, but asserts that the quoted language speaks for itself, and specifically
denies that the quoted language provides the Plaintiff with a cause of action in the case at hand.
7.

The State denies Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

8.

The State is without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or

falsity of Paragraph 9 of the Plaintiffs Complaint and therefore denies the same.

ANSWER -2

9.

With respect to Paragraph 10 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, to the extent that "the

intersection" refers to the intersection of an "internal collector street" with Chinden Boulevard as set
forth in Paragraph 5 of said Complaint, the State admits that said intersection serves the general
public, but is without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
remainder of said sentence and therefore denies the same. The State admits sentences 2 and 3 of
said Paragraph, but denies that said traffic counts provide the Plaintiff with support for a cause of
action in the instant lawsuit.
10.

In response to Paragraph 11 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the State re-alleges

Paragraphs 1-9 of its Answer as if set forth l l l y herein.
11.

The State denies Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

12.

The State admits the first sentence of Paragraph 14 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, but

denies the second sentence of said Paragraph, and specifically denies that a tax was imposed on the
Plaintiff.
13.

The State denies Paragraph 15 the Plaintiffs Complaint.

14.

In response to Paragraph 16 of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the State re-alleges

Paragraphs 1-13 of its Answer as if set forth l l l y herein.
15.

The State admits Paragraph 17 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

16.

The State denies Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

17.

In response to Paragraph 20 of the Plaintiff's Complaint, the State re-alleges

Paragraphs 1-16 of its Answer as if set forth fully herein.
18.

The State denies Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

ANSWER -3

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint is premature and not ripe for adjudication.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffhas failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

FOURTH AFFRIMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffhas waived any cause of action that it might have against the State.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is estopped &om claiming that it is entitled to compensation &om the State.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Complaint.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs alleged damages are consequential damages and are not recoverable under the
doctrine of damnum absque injuria.

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment as follows:
1.

That the Court enter its order determining that the State's actions do not constitute
an illegal tax, a (aking of Plaintiffs' property or property interest, or a violation of the
Plaintiffs due process rights or equal protection under law;

2.

That the Court enter its order determining that Plaintiff% actions for an illegal tax,
inverse condemnation, violation of substantive due process and equal protection be
dismissed with prejudice;

3.

ANSWER -4

That the State's reasonable attorneys fees and costs be awarded;

4.

That the State have such other and further relief as to the Court may appear just and
equitable in the premises.

DATED this 21* day of November, 2006.

... .. ............

STEVEN J. @USTER

ANSWER -5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of November, 2006, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

B

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Hovernight Mail
a ~ e l e c o p (Fax)
y
384-0442

Brian F. McColl
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise ID 83701-1544

'C;
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.

STEVEN J. $@USER
Deputy ~ @ eGenera1
~
Idaho Transportation Department

I

ATTORNEYGENERAL
STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #2153
Counsel for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
-VS-

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-0616178
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1
)

The State of Idaho and the Idaho Transportation Board, by and through Steven M. Parry,
one of the attorneys for the Defendant herein, hereby moves the Court for judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice in accordance with the provisions of IRCP 56 (c) upon
the grounds and for the reason that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

JMOTION
nth

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 1.R.C.P 56(c) - 1

00014

This Motion is based upon the pleadings of record and the accompanying Afldavit o j
Steven C. Hutchinson with supporting exhibits, and memorandum in support of the motion The

undisputed facts show that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in this
matter and the case must be dismissed without prejudice.
Dated this 26" day of December, 2006.
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STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of December, 2006, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Brian F. McColl
Wilson, McColl, & Rasmussen
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise ID 83701-1544

novernight Mail
n ~ e l e c o p (Fax)
y
384-0442
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/STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO LR.C.P 56(c) - 2
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G. WASDEN
GENERAL
STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #2153
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-0616178

'l

Plaintiff,

1
)
)

-VS-

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

1
1
)

This is a direct original action against the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation
Department to reimburse a real estate developer for certain road improvements it agreed to make

in exchange for a permit to occupy and use the States' Right-of-way. The State Right-of-way
permit has not been finalized and this memorandum is in support of the motion to dismiss the
complaint, because Plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative remedies with respect to its
application to use and occupy State Right-of-way.

n l

J

-

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1

Plaintiff applied to the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) for a permit to build a
new street connecting to US Highway 20126 (Chinden). The application process is governed by
IDAPA 39.03.42, RULES GOVERNING HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY ENCROACHMENTS
ON STATE RIGHTS OF WAY. ITD placed certain conditions on the approval of Plaintifrs
application. One of the conditions, as contemplated by IDAPA 39.03.42 was the construction of
a traffic signal at the new intersection.
Plaintiffs posted a letter of credit for the highway improvement needed for the
intersection and proceeded to commence construction of the new intersection on US Highway
20126. While Plaintiff or its agents were constructing the intersection they filed this suit against
ITD. It is ITD's position that the appropriate remedy for a real estate developer dissatisfied with
a condition of a Right-of-way Use Permit is contained in the IDAPA rule to file for a contested
case hearing with the agency.

IDAPA 39.03.42.003.04.

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION

DEPARTMENT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ACCESS TO STATE
HIGHWAYS.
Idaho Code $40-3 lO(9) provides:
The Board shall:
Designate state highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and
regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways to serve the traffic for
which the facility is intended.
Idaho Code $40-31O(9)
The Idaho Motor Vehicle Code, Idaho Code $49-202(23)(24) vests the Transportation Board
with similar powers:
(23) The department shall regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access
highway by any class or kind of traffic which is found to be incompatible with
the normal and safe movement of traffic.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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(24) The department shall erect and maintain traffic-control devices on
controlled-access highways on which any prohibitions are applicable.
Idaho Code $49-202(23)(24)

In exercise of its authority to designate highways as controlled access facilities and
regulate or prohibit access to those highways the Transportation Board adopted IDAPA 39.03.42
in 2001. Some of the highlights to the ITD IDAPA rule are:

Required. To help preserve the highways as constructed and provide
responsible growth where allowed, any individual, business, or other entity
planning to add, modify, relocate, maintain, or remove an encroachment on the
State highway or use highway right-of-way for any purpose other than normal
travel, shall obtain a permit to use State highway right-of-way. Encroachment
permits approved by the Department are required for private and public
approaches (driveways and streets), utilities and other miscellaneous
encroachments.

For major real estate developments such as Plaintiffs; a Traffic Impact Study is required. The
rule provides:
01. Transportation Impact Study PIS). To ensure that the State Highway
System can satisfactorily accommodate proposed development, a
Transportation impact study may be required. A TIS shall be required
when a new or an expanded existing development has direct access to the
State Highway System and adds a minimal number of trips as described
below:
a. A "full" TIS shall be required for developments that will generate one
hundred (100) or more new trips per hour (total two (2) way traffic)
during the highway's peak hour or when the total added volume will
equal or exceed one thousand (1,000) vehicles per day (a lesser
volume if required by the Department).
b. A "minor" TIS is required for developments that will generate
between twenty-five (25) and ninety-nine (99) new peak hour trips or
will add from two hundred fifty (250) to nine hundred ninety-nine
(999) vehicles per day.
c. A TIS shall document the extent of the impact of the proposed
development on the State Highway System, including additional trip,
resulting level of service during AM and PM peaks, and the need for
auxiliary lanes or other special capacity or safety features. Any
required changes in traffic control, land use, access, pedestrian, or

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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bicycle usage shall also be addressed.
02. Authority. The Department shall make the final decision regarding TIS
requirements.
03. Required. The developer shall provide and pay for the TIS, and the
Department will review the study.
IDAPA 39.03.42.301
With respect to the location and design of intersections with state highways and in
particular controlled access facilities such as US Highway 20126 the IDAPA rule provides:
400. LOCATION AND DESIGN STANDARDS FOR APPROACHES.
03. Required. Location, design, construction and operations of all
approaches shall comply with current Department geometric
standards and design principles.
04. Guidelines. The following access management guidelines shall be
considered on all approach applications;
a. Design approaches for current and future property access
requirements; and
b. Reduce conflicts associated access points through the
application of channelization, auxiliary lanes, joint-use
approaches, frontage and other local roads, restricted on-street
parking and off-street traffic circulation.
05. Signal Spacing. In order to maintain system capacity, safety and
efficiency, maximize signal progression and minimize delays to the
traveling public, all approaches and signals shall be spaced in
accordance with the following standards:
a. All traffic signal locations shall meet Department signal warrant
requirements and a signal operational analysis:
b. Location preference shall be given to State highways that meet
or may be reasonably expected to meet signal warrants within
(5) years;

Of particular import to this action is IDAPA 39.03.42.700 APPLICATION FEES; it
provides in pertinent part:
03. Miscellaneous Costs.

In addition to the application fee, the

-

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4
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Department may require payment of costs associated with the
following:
Study or appraisal review; or
a.
b. Appraisal fees required to establish the value of property for
new, additional, modification in design or use, or relocation of
approaches or other encroachments in a controlled access
highway.
Inspection fees may be charged at the discretion of the District
c.
Engineer when substantial inspection time will be required to
monitor and accept work done within the right-of-way. This
includes wages, travel, subsistence and other expenses incurred.
The intent is to recover only Department costs. When the
inspection fee is to be assessed, it shall be stipulated under the
application's special provisions. Travel time in excess of one
(1) hour, a loaded payroll rate, vehicle rental cost, subsistence
and other expenses incurred, If additional inspections are
required, the permittee will be billed a flat fee as determined by
the Department at the time the permit is issued.
d. A performance bond may be required of an applicant at the
discretion of the Department. The purpose of this bond is to
guarantee completion of the work in accordance with the
requirements of the permit. The bond amount should be large
enough to cover costs to correct potential damage that might be
caused by the permittee. The bond shall be executed by a surety
company authorized to conduct business in Idaho.
e. Construction of hi~hwav modifications or improvements,
including but not limited to signals, illumination. signs,
pavement markings, delineation wardrail and culverts;
f. Changes or adjustments made to highway or fixtures;
IDAPA 39.03.42.700.03 (Emvhasis added)
With the construction of the highway improvements, as agreed to by Plaintiff and Defendant, the
appraisal fees and increase in value in Plaintiffs real estate with the use of the State property
were waived by ITD.
But for the litigation, when Plaintiff had completed the agreed to improvements to US
Highway 20126 for the new intersection, ITD's property (the new approach) would be deeded to
the Plaintiff. This is summarized in IDAPA 39.03.42.300.04 with:
04. Deed Requirement. Relocation of existing approaches and additional
approaches shall require a new exchange deed showing the access by

-

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5
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highway station, approach width and use type. Removed approaches shall
require a correction deed that references the original legal document of
title in which access rights were removed.
IDAPA 39.03.42.300.04
Presumably Plaintiff would then deed the approach to Ada County Highway District (ACHD) to
make it a public road connection. The present status of Plaintiffs permit application to use
ITD's property is partially completed executory contract. ITD has no involvement in the platting
process and access to state highway right-of-way is governed exclusively by IDAPA 39.03.42,
Title 40 and Title 49, Idaho Code.
The ITD rule provides for a clear appeal process through the Administrative Procedures
Act. IDAPA 39.03.42.003 provides in part:
03. Initial Appeal Process. The District will have fourteen (14) working
days to review the appeal. If the District does not overturn the original
denial, the appeal shall be forwarded to the State Traffic Engineer who
will have fourteen (14) working days to review and prepare it for review
by the Department's Chief Engineer. The Department's Chief Engineer
will have fourteen (14) working days to review the appeal. The appellant
shall be notified by certified mail within seven (7) working days of the
Department's Chief Engineer's decision.
04. Secondary Appeal Process. If further arbitration is required, the
appellant has thirty (30) days following denial notification to contact the
Department's legal section and the appeal process will be initiated in
accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act and IDAPA
04.1 1.0 1, "Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney
General".
IDAPA 39.03.42.003
s reference
The reference to the Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney ~ e n e r a l ' ithe
for the rules

of practice

.

. .

...

&d procedur6 for contested case hearings. See: Idaho code $67.

.

.

.

....

5206(4). This iS the f&m ITD believes Plaintiff is required to use, if it wishes to contest the
A.,vz,rr.,T7:.*~;;.~,-$?,Fy:-;.:;::F
quoted in the above rule this permit was signed and issued by the
.>~:~wnd:&o~~o@;aiperrmt?~-...As
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Chief Engineer for the Idaho Transportation Department.
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This matter is particularly ripe for a dismissal without prejudice and remand to the
agency in that the permit and application to use State Right-of-way is still in an executory mode.
As a representative example:
1.
2.
3.

Plaintiff has obtained no deeded property rights to ITD property
Plaintiff has not deeded to ITD any of the property needed for the highway
improvements.
Plaintiff has not turned over ownership of the traffic control devices
required as a condition of the permit.

Plaintiff could apply to ITD in accordance with IDAPA 39.03.42 for a contested case hearing
for a determination of the appropriate traffic control devices, if an approach is to be granted at
this location. ITD, when it uses State funds for an intersection safety project will usually build
medians to prevent deadly left hand turn movements on high-speed highways.
It is the permit application and issuance pursuant to lDAPA 39.03.42 that is the agency
action in this litigation. This includes the exchange of property rights between the State of Idaho
and the Plaintiff. One of Plaintiffs duties, with respect to the permit, is to provide a safe
intersection for the new access to US Highway 20126, which the Transportation Board has
designated as a controlled access highway.
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT
Idaho Code $67-5271(1) provides:

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. - (1) A person is not entitled to
judicial review of an agency action until that person has exhausted all
administrative remedies required in this chapter.
Idaho Code $67-5271(1)

An agency action is defined as, "an agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty
placed upon it by law." Idaho Code $67-5201(3)(c). Provision of law is defined as any rule of
the agency. Idaho Code $67-5201(17)(b). Additionally, the Transportation Board's broad
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statutory authority to, "regulate, restrict or prohibit access" qualifies as an agency action when it
granted access to Plaintiff on US Highway 20126.
In Westway Construction Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Department, 139 Idaho 107,
73 P.3d 721 (2003) our Supreme Court defined what actions by an Agency constitute a contested
case with:
Finally, to be a contested case the decision by the ITD as to whether
Westway is entitled to return of its bid security must "determine the legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities or other legal interests" of specific
persons. Idaho Code 567-5240 (2001). Whether or not that decision
determines legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities or other legal
interests reauires a two-step analysis.
First, has the legislature granted the agencv the authoritv to determine the
particular issue? If an agency does not have the authority to resolve a
particular issue, then the agency cannot determine a party's legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests regarding that issue.
Second, does the agencv decision on the issue determine "the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests" of one or more
persons? Not all decisions of particular applicability by an agency
determine a person's legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other
legal interests. Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 132 Idaho
221, 970 P.2d 14 (1998). In this case, the ITD's decision to forfeit the
$538,241.32 bid bond issued by USF&G and submitted by Westway with
its bid certainly determined their legal rights, duties, or other legal
interests.
139 Idaho at 111-112 (Emphasis added)
Clearly both prongs of the test are applicable. It is clear that ITD has the authority to determine
if and how real estate developers will access controlled access highways on the state system.
Second, as Lochsa Falls in its complaint alleges that the traffic signal cost it $176,986.00. That
at least should qualify under the "other legal interest." It should be noted that ITD has not
accepted ownership of the traffic signal. Once an agency decision qualifies as an "Order" then it
is ITD's position that the Administrative Procedures Act is controlling.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

00023

The Administrative Procedures Act requires that the relief sought by the Plaintiff, in its
complaint, need to be brought exclusively under the act. The District Court when reviewing a
final order from a contested case has the authority to:
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutorv orovisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
Idaho Code $67-5279(3) (Emphasis added)
Clearly Plaintiffs complaint is seeking a ruling from this Court, outside of the Administrative
Procedures Act, that the conditions ITD placed on the permit were either in violation of or in
excess of the authorities granted to ITD in Titles 40 and 49, Idaho Code or unconstitutional.

In Curtis v. City of Ketchurn, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210 (1986) the property owner sued
the city in inverse condemnation for not allowing his subdivision access to a city street. In the
present case, there is temporary access with disputed conditions placed on the permit. The
Supreme Court unanimously and unequivocally held that the property owner's exclusive remedy
for even claimed constitutional issues (inverse condemnation) was pursuant to the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act:
Appellant's arguments are nothing more than a challenge of the city council's
quasi-judicial action denying his subdivision application. As such, the
express provisions of LC. 4967-6519, 6521(d), limit appellant's remedy to
seeking judicial review of the city council's action pursuant to LC. $675215(b)-(g). Both LC. $867-5619 and 67-6521(d) require that such review be
sought within 60 days of the city council's action. In Bone v. City of
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), we held that LC. S 6752151b)-(g) orovided parties aggrieved by a zoning commission or city
council's decision relative to zoning issues with a "complete, detailed. and
exhaustive remedv.. .". Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho at 847,693 P.2d
at 1049. Indeed, one of the express bases upon which review may be had
pursuant to LC. 467-5215 is that the governing body's actions (e.g., the city
council's decision) are "In violation of constitutional ... provisions."

-
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LC. 5 67-5215(g)(l). Again, as stated in Bone: "We find no evidence that
the legislature intended other avenues of appeal to be available ...[Therefore,]
we hold that 567-5215@)-(g) is the exclusive source of a~pealfor adverse
zoning decisions!' Bone v. city ofLewiston 107 Idaho at 847, 848, 693 P.2d
at 1049,1050
111 Idaho at 33 (Emphasis added)
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is primarily aimed at agencies of the State such as the
Defendant. Local units of govemment only gain agency under the Administrative Procedures
Act status when operating under the Local Land-Use Planning Act. The holding in Curtis should
be just as applicable to ITD in this case.
As recent as November 29 of this year our Supreme Court in Cowan v. Board of
Commissioners of Fremont County, 2006 Opinion No. 107 (November 29, 2006) held with

respect to an Administrative Procedures Act appeal:
Moreover, our case law makes it clear that constitutional issues not raised
before a Board of Commissioners will not be considered on appeal. Butters v.
Hauser, 125 Idaho 79,82,867 P.2d 953,956 (1993)
Cowan v. Board of Commissioners ofFremont County, 2006 Opinion No. 107

There can be no dispute for purposes of this Motion that Plaintiff made no valid attempt to
exercise its remedies before the agency. Plaintiff made no attempt to comply with the IDAPA
rule for appeals and did not even raise an objection to the State Official that issued the permit.
Of particular import with respect to the administrative remedies is the holding of Regan
v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721,100 P.3d 615 (2004) where the Supreme Court held:

The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] person is not
entitled to judicial review of an agency action until that person has exhausted
all administrative remedies required in this chapter." LC. 567-5271. The
doctrine of exhaustion requires that where an administrative remedy is provided
by statute, reiief must first be sought by exhausting such remedies before the
courts will act. McKart v. United States, 395 US. 185, 193-95, 89 S.Ct. 1657,
1662-63 23 L.Ed.2d 194, 202-204 (1969); Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381,
383, 766 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ct.App.1988). No one is entitled to judicial relief for

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10

00025

a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41,50-51,58
S.Ct. 459, 463-64, 82 L.Ed. 638, 644-45 (1938). Furthermore, the doctrine of
exhaustion generally requires that the case run the 111 gamut of administrative
proceedings before an application for judicial relief may be considered. Palmer
v. Board of County Comm'rs of Blaine County, 117 Idaho 562, 565, 790 P.2d
343, 346 (1990) (citing Grever v. Idaho Telephone Co., 94 Idaho 900,903,499
P.2d 1256, 1259 (1972)). If a claimant fails to exhaust administrative remedies,
dismissal of the claim is warranted. See e.g. Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137
Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 641 (2002). In m i t e v. Bannock County
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003), this Court recently
reaffirmed the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of exhaustion:
As we have previously recognized, important policy considerations underlie the
requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the
opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention,
deferring to the administrative process established by the Legislature and the
administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial h c t i o n s of
the administrative body Id. at 401-402, 80 P.3d at 337-38 (citations omitted).

p~dministrativerecord alreadv in existence. not some new record made
m the revlewme court," Cama v. Pitts. 411 U.S. 138. 142. 93 S.Ct.
1241.1244.36 L.Ed.2d 106.111 (1973).

. .

In Idaho, as a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v.
State, 123 Idaho 899,906,854 P.2d 242,249 (1993).
140 Idaho at 724-725 (Emphasis added)
,~>xs::-5,~p

It is the development of the administrative record that is of important in this matter. &&...I:,.,,.:./
present, there is no administrative record for this Court to review.

The Adininlstratlve

Procedures Act requires that prior to having Judicial review of the agency action that the Agency
Head (Department Director) make a reasoned decision. Plaintiff, in this action, did not even
protest to the Chief Engineer (Division Administrator) who issued the permit.
Instead,.,;*:'?of*M
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Supreme Court was reviewing judgments entered by this very Court for the government
Defendants.
As this Court will recall, KMST involved the construction of a new ACHD road by the
developer at its own cost as a condition of development and rezoning.

The Supreme Court

quoted with approval this Court's findings with the following:
The district court found "that as a general matter developers do not include
conditions in development applications if they disagree with the conditions."
The district court also found, "KMST representatives included the construction
and dedication of Bird Street in the application because they were concerned
that failing to do so would delay closing on the property and development of
the property." KMST's property was not taken. It voluntarily decided to
dedicate the road to the public in order to speed the approval of its
development. Having done so, it cannot now claim that its property was
Yaken."
138 Idaho at 582
The facts are very similar to this action. Here, Plaintiff obtained an access permit from ITD with
certain conditions attached. Plaintiff stood mute concerning the conditions (i.e. no IDAPA
appeal or even protest to the Chief Engineer). Plaintiff, in this case, has not completed the
conditions (i.e. ITD has not accepted the work as complete). Similar to K1MST, Plaintiff has
begun using the government's property with its access to the highway.
Plaintiff, in this action, accepted the conditions of the permit,

"

... in order to speed the

approval of its development." 138 Idaho at 582. Without the ITD permit it is unknown what
development rights Plaintiff could have secured from the City of Meridian or access rights it
could have obtained from ACHD.
The above-quoted holding in KMST is applicable to the facts as plead in Plaintiffs
complaint. The KMST holding is very similar to the holding in KTVB v. Boise City, 94 Idaho
279,486 P.2d 992 (1971). KTVB competed for a contract with the City and was unsuccess~l.
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It then filed suit claiming the process was illegal. The Court applied an estoppel analysis holding
that you cannot participate in an administrative bidding process and then claim it to be illegal.
The Idaho Court, quoting a Hawaii decision, stated, "This class of estoppel is sometimes
expressed in the language of the rule or maxim that one cannot blow both hot and cold." 94
Idaho at 28 1.
This is the exact situation the Court is faced with here. Plaintiff sought and obtained all
the benefits of obtaining access to US Highway 20126 in a temporary access permit and now
comes to this Court and claims the terms of the permit are illegal. By remanding the matter back
to ITD, Plaintiff will not have the luxury of taking the inconsistent positions (i.e. blow both hot
and cold). Additionally, all Plaintiffs rights of Judicial Review will be preserved. The Court
will benefit by having a complete agency record and a reasoned decision from the head of the
agency.
The KMST appeal also dealt with the impact fees charged by ACHD for the development.
ITD in this appeal is not charging any, what could be labeled, impact fees. As stated earlier, ITD
did not require the appraisal of the property and payment of its increased value. The only issue
before the Court are the traffic control devices that were required as part of the permit to use and
occupy state property.
An additional distinction must be drawn between KMST and this action and that is the
ACHD ordinance allowed for the impact fees to be paid under protest. ITD's rule and policies
do not have any provision for accepting the conditions of a permit, having it issued and then
challenging one of the conditions.
With respect to the impact fees charged by ACHD the Supreme Court held:
. . . ., ..

.

As ageneral-ruleflparty must exh-ausi admiiiistiafive remedies before resorting
to tlie cou~%to ~~~~~~~~~~the validity o f admiiiistiative~acts.AFnzen v. Srute,
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rule in two instances: (a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when
the aaencv acted outside its authority. Id. Neither of those exceptions applies in
this :~S~.'KMST had the ~ ~ ~ o r ttouchallenge
n i ~ ~ the calculation of theimpact
fees administratively, and it chose not to do so.
KMSTLLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho at 583.

The very same exhaustion argument applies in this case. The two exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion are not applicable in this case.
The first exception, "in the interests of justice" does not apply. The traffic control
devices required in the permitting process are for the safety of the traveling public. ITD has an
affirmative duty to ensure that all approaches to State Highways do not create dangerous
conditions. Esterbrook v. Idaho Transportation Department, 124 Idaho 680, 863 P.2d 349
(1993). In Esterbrook, the Court recognized the tort of negligently permitting of a driveway.
The interests of justice weigh in ITD's favor because once the intersection Plaintiff is
constructing is completed; ITD will inherit the tort liability.
Had Plaintiff used the administrative process, then other less costly options could have
been discussed. Plaintiff could have obtained reasonable access to its property through the
ACHD network of highways and not incurred the expense of an approach to US Highway 20126.
As stated earlier, the IDAPA rule has lengthy discussion on the use of medians to promote
safety. The posted speed limit for this section of US Highway 20126 is 55 mph. This is truly a
safety issue. ~
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The KTVB decision would also indicate that "in the interests of justice" the matter should
be decided by the agency in the first instance. This would eliminate Plaintiffs ability to accept
the benefits of the permit and then collaterally attack the safety conditions attached to the permit.
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The second exception is, "when the agency acted outside of its authority." ITD followed
its legislatively approved IDAPA rule in granting the permit. The IDAPA rule provides that
developers will be required to pay for and install traffic control devices, including traffic signals
in exchange for the right to encroach on State Right-of-way.
Idaho Code $67-5292(1)provides:
Expiration of administrative rules. - (1) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this chapter to the contrary, every rule adopted and becoming effective after
June 30, 1990, shall automatically expire on July 1 of the following year unless
the rule is extended by statute. Extended rules shall then continue to expire
annually on July 1 of each succeeding year unless extended by statute in each
such succeeding year.
Idaho Code $67-5292(1)
The IDAPA rule Plaintiff is challenging has gone through yearly review by the Legislature and
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advisory, but it is not being offered in this memorandum for the point of the validity of the rule
but simply that ITD was acting within its authority when it granted the right-of-way use permit
with the conditions.
The only deviation fiom the legislatively approved IDAPA rule is Plaintiffs complaint in
this Court without the exhaustion of administrative remedies or at least raising the issue to ITD
management that there is some issue. Granting Defendant's motion will rectifL the deviation.
The Court should view this as a land exchange. The IDAPA rule provides that at the end
of the permitting process Plaintiff would end up with deeded access rights to the controlled
access state highway (... additional approaches shall require a new exchange deed.. .. IDAPA
39.3.42.300.04). The permit to use State property is either valid or not. Just like a contract the
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Court's role is not to rewrite the permit or a contract, but to declare the matter as a whole valid or
invalid.
On the issue of exhaustion of remedies and the exception for agencies acting outside of
their authority, the Court must focus on whether ITD had the authority to issue the Right-of-way
Encroachment permit; not whether a particular condition contained within the permit was
justified or warranted. The special conditions for each individual Right-of-way Encroachment
permit fall within the agency's expertise and would dictate that the administrative process should
be followed.
With no exceptional circumstances in this case and the access permit still being
temporary, Plaintiff is required to follow the State Administrative Procedures Act and the
Department's rule on Encroachments on State Right-of-way. If Plaintiff's permit had gone final
then a dismissal with prejudice would be the appropriate remedy. With the temporary or
executory nature of the permit a dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate remedy, allowing
Plaintiff to seek redress with the Agency and then, if necessary Judicial Review pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act.
THERE IS NO INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM

Dawson Enterprises v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977) defines an
inverse condemnation with:

In short, Inverse condemnation is invoked in situations where, as the United
States Supreme Court stated in Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 82
S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962), a governmental entity "in designing it (the
project) had to acquire some private property," but where "by constitutional
standards it did not acquire enough." 369 U.S. at 89,90,82 S.Ct. at 534.
This Court has entertained such claims when a government project interferes
with private property rights by the flooding of neighboring land, Renninger v.
State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 9 11 (1950); Zollinger v. Big Lost River Irrigation
District, 83 Idaho 411, 364 P.2d 176 (1961); or by impairing access to an
owner's property through the destruction of his ingress-egress curb cuts,

-
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Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho
222,360 P.2d 799 (1961); Lobdell v. State, 89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965);
Snyder v. State, 92 Idaho 175, 438 P.2d 920 (1968); or by converting the
airspace over an owner's land to public use, Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho
557,394 P.2d 641 (1964).
Idaho's inverse condemnation cases form a pattern with common elements:
(1) a governmental project of some sort (a new bridge, a reconstructed highway,
a dam operation, an airport extension) is undertaken; (2) the construction or
operation thereof damages or destroys the vested property rights of an adjoining
land owner; (3) aRer which suit is brought to recover damages.

98 Idaho at 5 17
Plaintiff cannot qualify for either of the two prongs of the above stated elements. ITD has no
project on US Highway 20126 and Plaintiff has no vested property right that is being infringed
upon. Plaintiff applied for a permit to use ITD property. ITD approved the permit with certain
conditions. Plaintiff accepted those conditions at the Agency level and now is suing to challenge
the conditions it voluntarily accepted.
On the issue of vested property right our Supreme Court has long held:
However, "(o)nce again, we hold that a property owner has no vested
interest in the highest and best use of his land, in the soley monetary sense
of that term." (citations omitted)
Sprenger, Grubb &Associates v. City ofHailey, 127 Idaho 576,581,903 P.2d 741 (1995).

This is the issue in this action in that in order to develop a higher and more intense use of the

property Plaintiff needed to obtain access to US Highway 20126. T h e ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ g g ~ & & ~ ~
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Clearly Plaintiffs application for and acceptance of a permit to use State Right-of-way
does not qualify as a, "governmental project of some sort."

Dawson Enterprises v. Blaine
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CONCLUSION
This Court's comments in KMST, as approved by the Supreme Court, apply to this action
four square. The real distinction in this case is that Plaintiff has not obtained any property right
in its encroachment permit. In other words, ITD has not provided for deeded access and Plaintiff
has not transferred ownership of the traffic controlled devices called for in the permit. 333s.
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very pleased to cancel the permit and have Plaintiff obtain access to its property through its
frontage on the ACHD network of highways.
If Plaintiff is objecting to a traffic signal, then through the administrative appeal process
other traffic safety measures could always he considered; if the approach were to stay open.
The Supreme Court in Regan held that it is the agency record that the District Court is to

review in deciding these issues. O ~ i j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i - * ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ t ~
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Plaintiff never objected to the State official, Division

Administrator, issuing the permit that it felt one of the conditions was not reasonable or
authorized by law.
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IDAPA rule as applied to its permit
.
. mandates that any Judicial
standing
. . .legislatively
. . . . . . . .approved

review be done by a review of the agency record after a contested case hearing on the matter.
The key to determining whether the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable is
whether or not the decision by the Agency is, "of particular applicability that determines ....legal
interests of one (1) or more specific persons." Idaho Code $67-5201(12) ITD is an agency. The
decision to grant or deny an encroachment permit determines the legal interests of the Plaintiff.
Additionally the IDAPA rule mandates this avenue of review.
By dismissing the complaint, the Court will allow Plaintiff to exhaust its administrative
remedies, which if it is not successful in front of the agency will have developed a full
administrative record and be able to file an appeal pursuant to the State Administrative
Procedures Act.
The issue comes down to if there is to be an intersection at that location on US Highway
20126 then what measures need to be taken for an acceptable level of safety to the traveling
public. This is a safety issue that should be decided by the Transportation Board. Once the
intersection becomes permanent ITD has the tort liability for a dangerous condition.
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'

The Defendant, Transportation Board, would request this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs
complaint without prejudice for the reason that Plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative
remedies pursuant to IDAPA 39.03.42.
Dated this

6?ay

of r) CcLyv\'3a";-2006.
'\.

(v
\ -.
,
STEVEN M. PARRY
....Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

L

Z

'\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

2) L

day of

, J ~<c,M
.

Gig, 2006, I

caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Brian F. McColl
Wilson, McColl, & Rasmussen
420 W. Washington
PO BOX 1544
Boise ID 83701-1544

W.S.
Mail
n H a n d Delivered
Dovemight Mail
n ~ e l e c o p y(Fax) 384-0442

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #2153
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.
State of Idaho

1

County of Ada

)

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-0616178

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN C.
HUTCHINSON IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

1
1
1
1
1

:ss.
Steven C. Hutchinson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I

1.
I

I am currently Chief Engineer for the Idaho Transportation Department. The
position of Chief Engineer is created by Idaho Code Section 40-503(2).

I
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2.

Marked as Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a
true and correct copy of the Right of Way Encroachment Application and Permit
#3-05-042 issued to Lochsa Falls LLC on November 19,2004.

3.

The permit was approved by my predecessor, Jim D. Ross, in his capacity as
Chief Engineer for the Idaho Transportation Department.

4.

All State Right-of-way encroachments, including this permit, are governed by
IDAPA 39.03.42.

5.

The encroachment permit allows for a new 60 foot approach onto US Highway
20/26. The average daily traffic on this section of US Highway 20/26 was 14,000
in 2005. The application for the encroachment permit included a Traffic Impact
Study prepared by Washington Infrastructure Services. The study prepared by
Lochsa Falls' consultant and submitted as part of its application that the real
estate development covers 335 acres which includes 861 single family residential
units, 171 apartments and 282,100 square feet of office/cornmercial development.
The study indicates that, "The proposed development is projected to generate an
average daily traffic (ADT) of 12,480 vehicles per day (vpd), of which the peak
hour traffic (PHT) is 1,396 vehicles per hour (vph)." (Lochsa Falls Traffic Impact
Study P. 1) Marked as Exhibit B, attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference is a true and correct copy of the proposed site map for Lochsa Falls
subdivision taken from the Washington Infrastructure Services Traffic Impact
Study for Lochsa Falls subdivision.
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7.

With the grant or denial of any Right of Way Encroachment Permit for an
approach to a State highway the primary criteria in the design of the approach is
the safety of the traveling public. The Traffic Impact Study performed for Lochsa
Falls and submitted as part of its application for the Right of Way Encroachment
Permit recommended the installation of a traffic signal for one of the access
points to US Highway 20126. The Department modified the location of the signal
during the permitting process.

8.

,,-

"."-

,-

.

.. .

It-isstandard.prOcedure'forth~~LTr~~portati6nnDepartmcnt
that ifail ilegotiations

the applicant..prop.efi%;mvner.:h.:the1TD::EegtiPSectiofilfor the?:s?&ed~lifig-6fa

..

.,.

;

.:,,

.

.

..

..

..

. ..

..

.

.

. . - . r m m e n d a t i o n - - g &?O~ h ~the Transportation Department Director for fiilal
m&w~This permit was issued by my predecessor and I
have no first hand knowledge of what occurred in this matter.
9.

To my knowledge the Idaho Transportation Department has never paid in full or
in part for any highway improvements or traffic control devices associated with a
property owner's Right of Way Encroachment Application for an Approach to a
State Highway.

10.

Marked as Exhibit C, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a
true and correct copy of the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in the matter
of Asin and Moody, an application denial on SH 44. Marked as Exhibit D,
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct copy of
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the Director's final decision in the matter of Asin and Moody. I have been
informed that the Administrative Appeal is pending before Judge McKee. Ha
Lochsa Falls not accepted the conditions placed on Permit 3-05-042, this is the
procedure the Department would have followed to determine whether the permit
should be issued and if issued, what conditions should be placed on the permit in
accordance with the Department's rule on access, its Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices (ISAPA 39.03..41) and Idaho Transportation Department Board
Policies.
11.

The Department has no provisions in its IDAPA rules, Transportation Board
policies or any of its manuals that would allow for an applicant for a Right of
Way Encroachment Permit to accept the issuance of a permit with conditions
under protest.

12.

According to the Department's records at no time did Lochsa Falls appeal the
issuance of the Right of Way Encroachment permit in accordance with IDAPA
39.03.42 nor is there any evidence in the Department files that Lochsa Falls
protested to anyone at the Headquarters of the Idaho Transportation Department.

Dated this

db*

day of

3-=
~ ~

3 a 2006.
,
+

Chief E n ~ n e e r
Idaho ~r&s~ortation
Department
to before me this=day

of

,2006.
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Residing at ,Ad&- &L+&
Idaho
MYCommission e x p i r e s 3 d 2 S

IJ

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

dhK

day of December, 2006, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Brian F. McColl
Wilson, McColl, & Rasmussen
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise ID 83701-1544

m.~.
Mail
n ~ a n Delivered
d
o0vemight Mail
n ~ e l e c o p (Fax)
y
384-0442

Legal Assistant to Steven M. Parry
Idaho Transportation Department
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EXHIBIT A

Kight~Qf-. ay Encroachment A p p l i ~ a ' ' ~And Permit

ITD 2109 (Re<. 05-04)

&oaches And Other Encroa-.&ents

GPS Coordinates

Quantity
Approach

Max. 1

Width ISize

blrt~

Culvert (Ifreq'd)
Approach Type

.

K ~ e s i d e n t i a(SF,
l MF)

0 Lt. Commercial

Multiple Approaches

.

Est; Volume (VehiclesIDay

Yes - Attach page for each
additional approach

[Z) Heavy Commercial

Agricultural

0Joint Use

Remarks:

Attach the following:

1. A completed Encroachment Checklist, applicable ownership documents, multiple approach permit sheets.
2. Written authorization from the owner (if needed).
3. Plans or drawings (3 sets) ~ h o w i n g ' p r o ~ o s work,
ed
approach locations, draihage details, landscaping,
striping plans, and traffic control. (include Department roadway alignment or project plans when available.)
j si il I; i l
L
,
4. Special Provislons and Traffic Confrol Plans.
/>*"'...,.-,.-...
,.,,A, C c. /.P 5
:2:..~,$ficr
&"< lt t) , , p; 5 <,( ,,? ;.-<, g:.<,t.
i
I
Icertify that Iam the Owner or Authorized Representative of the property to be served and request permission to construct the
above faciiities within the State Highway Rights-of-way in.accordancewith the General Provisions printed on the reverse side
of this form, the Special Provisions, and the Plans made a part of this permit. This permit SHALL BE VOID if ail work is no2
:

' -
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A

SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Permit 3-05-042
Developer shall design and construct a signal prior to its being warranted. The
standards and specifications shall meet the requirements of both the Ada County
Highway District (A.C.H.D.) and the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD).
A Performance Bond or a Certificate of Deposit in the amount of $180,000.00, shall
be provided by the developer for the signal, prior to any work being done on the
highway right of way.
A center turn lane shall be constructed by the developer to meet ITD standards.
A deceleration lane, a minimum of 240' (120' taper & 100' storage), shall be
constructed to ITD standards. The lane may be longer as required by the
Transportation Impact Study.
Permit holder shall relinquish all other rights to access US-20126 (Chinden Blvd.).
Cross access shall be granted to the adjoining properties with highway frontage.
See attached:
S.P. 1Traffic Control
S.P. 4 Ballast Requirements for Approaches & Mailbox Turnouts
S.P. 5 Widening of Roadways
S.P. 6 Landscaping
S.P. 10 Materials
S.P. 11 Monuments
S.P. 12 Seeding

@

@

SPECIAL PROVISION 1-TRAFFIC CONTROL
All Traffic control plans will be approved by the District Traffic section before
work begins.

I

/

No work will be allowed during hours of 6:00 A.M. to 8:30 A.M. and 4:OOP.M. to
7:00 P.M. on the following highway sections:
I M.P. 24.94 (1-84) [Caldwell] to M.P. 52.812 (1-84)
US-20126
] [Broadway Interchange]
I M.P. 12.299 (SH-16) to M.P. 21.814 (Glenwood St.) and
SH-44
I M.P. 1.310 (State St.) to 0.00 (Chinden)
I M.P. 0.000 (State St.) to 13.927 (SH-52).
SH-16
* All other locations will be approved on an individual basis.
No work will be allowed during hours of 5:30 AM to 9:00 AM and 3:30 PM to
7:00 PM on the following highkay sections:
1-84
I M.P. 24.839 to59.920
1-184
I M.P. 0.00 to 3.620
(This covers from 1-84
US-20126
M.P. 47.290 to 48.512
to 13" St., the Connector)
* All other locations will be approved on an individual basis.

I

All utility work, work involving lane closures or lane restrictions will be done as
night work. wight
- - work is defmed as between the hours of 1OP.M. and 5A.M.1.
This applies to the following highway sections:
I M.P. 0.948 - 0.150, 19.680 - 20.520.50.080 I I-84B
(CaldwellINampa business loop) 61.797
SH-44
US-20126
1-84
1-184
US-20126

M.P. 12.320 (SH-16) to M.P. 0.00 (US-20126)
I [Glennwood & Chinden]
I M.P. 33.267 (Star Rd.) to M.P. 52.812 (1-84)
[Broadway Interchange]
M.P. 24.839 t059.920
(This covers from 1-84 to
M.P. 0.00 to 3.620
M.P. 47.290 to 48.5 12 13" St., the Connector)

When work is being done the signing sequence shall include a sign to identie the
contractor and the utility company with the utility companies contact number.
All flagging personnel shall have a current State of Idaho flagging certification.

Revised 6-24-04
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SPECIAL PROVISION 4
BALLAST REQUIREMENTS FOR APPROACHES
AND MAILBOX TURNOUTS
BALAST SECTION FOR APPROACHES:
PAVED APPROACHES:
0.15' - W Plantmix Pavement Class Illusing Performance Graded Asphalt Binder, PG 58-28 or better.
0.35' -Type "B" )/4" Untreated Aggregate for Base.
BALLAST SECTION FOR MAIL BOX TURNOUTS:
Plantmix - Match the adjacent roadway, except where the existing plantmix is thicker that 0.4'. The
maximum thickness of plantmix for mailbox turnouts shall be 0.4'. The plantmix pavement shall be W
Class using Performance Graded Asphalt Binder, PG 58-28 or better.
Base and Subbase -Match the adjacent base and subbase. The ballast section shall be placed no thinner
than 0.35' Type " B W Untreated Aggregate for base, and 0.70' for subbase.
Geotextile - Geotextile shall be placed between the subgrade and the subbase. The geotextile shall
function for subgrade separation and drainage. The geotextile shall be Drainable and Non-woven with the
strength of a Subgrade Separation Geotextile Type II per 718.07 and with the Permittivity and AOS of
7 18.05-Drainage Geotextile.

Revised 1-6-05

SPECIAL PROVISION 5:
Widening of Roadways by Permit
Original shoulder width shall be retained. Any widening of the roadway shall include
widening to attain original lane widths, original shoulder width and all designs shall meet
ITD standards.
This provision shall supercede any plans.

Revised 1-6-05

SPECIAL PROVISION 6-LANDSCAPING

Berms and/or fences will not be permitted within the State Highway Right of
Way.
Only flowers, grasses, shrubs and trees with a mature height not to exceed
three (3) feet or trimmed with no limbs between three (3) feet and five (5)
feet in urban areas and three (3) feet and seven (7) feet in rural areas will be
allowed within the sight triangle at comers and the safety clear zone of the
State Highway.
Trees with a mature trunk diameter of over six (6) inches are not allowed in
the clear zone in rural areas. When there is a barrier curb, trees are allowed if
they do not interfere with sight triangles or State Highway signs.
Landscaping shall be short enough or trimmed so it doesn't interfere with
State Highway signs.
No rocks over four (4) inches maximum size will be allowed within the State
Highway right of way.
Sprinkler heads shall be no closer than five (5) feet from the pavement edge
and shall be adjusted so as not to cause water to cover any part of the
highway surface.
Landscaping shall be placed so as not to disturb the normal drainage patterns
within the State Highway Right of Way.
The permit holder shall return to original condition and re-seed all areas
disturbed by his construction within the State Highway Right of Way to the
satisfaction of the District Engineer.
Repair of landscaping due to highway maintenance shall be the
responsibility of the permittee. The State will not be responsible for or
participate in any repair or maintenance costs.

Revised 1-6-05

SPECIAL PROVISION 10

Materials and Workmanship
All materials and workmanship that are incorporated in the permitted operation shall
meet all requirements of Idaho Transportation Department's Standard and Supplemental
Specifications for Highway Construction and any pertinent design standards.

Revised 1-6-05

SPECIAL PROVISION 11: MONUMENTATION
IDAHO STATUTES

PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 12
ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS
54-1234. MONUMENTATION -- PENALTY AND LIABILITY FOR DEFACING. If any
person shall wilfully deface, injure or remove any signal, monument,
building or other object set as a permanent boundary survey marker by a
registered, professional land surveyor, he shall forfeit a sum not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense, and shall be
liable for damages sustained by the affected parties in consequence of
such defacing, injury or removal, to be recovered in a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
TITLE 18
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
CHAPTER 70
TRESPASS AND MALICIOUS INJURIES
TO PROPERTY
18-7021. INJURING MONUMENTS, ORNAMENTS, AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. Every
person, not the owner thereof, who wilfully mars, disfigures, breaks or
otherwise injures, or molests, removes or destroys, any work of art,
monument, landmark, historic structure, shade tree, shrub, ornamental
plant, or useful or ornamental improvement, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Revised 1-6-05

SPECIAL PROVISIONS-SEEDING

PROJECT SEEDING
This work shall consist of seedbed preparation and sowing seed on prescribed areas in accordance
with these specifications.
MATERIALS
Seed shall be labeled and meet the standards of the Federal Seed Act and the Idaho State Seed
laws.
SEED
The following seed mix as marked shall be used on this project:
Northernhigher altitude sites,
LBS BULK SEEDIACRE

Grasses:
"Durar" Hard Fescue (FEOVD)
"Garrison" Meadow Foxtail (ALAR)
"Manchar" Smooth Brome ( B W
Legume:
White Dutch Clover (TRRE)

L.

2

Total

5

CZ]Southerdower altitude sites
Grasses:

LBS BULK SEEDIACRE

"Sodar' Streambank W.G. (AGRI)
Siberian W.G. (AGSI)
"Ephraim" Crested W.G.
Legume:

2

Ladak Alfalfa
Total

5

SEASON OF WORK
Seeding on this project is to be done in fall between September 15 and November 15.
Seeding operations shall not be done when soil is too wet or dry, frozen, or otherwise untillable.

C O M M E P ~ A LSEEQV~NDORS
NATIVE SEED VENUORS
I)

CITY

NAME

ADDRESS

APPLEWOO~JSEED COMPANY
ARKANSAS VALLEY SEEDS
BLACKCANYON SEED FARMS
CLEARWATER SEED CO
CLYDE ROBIN SEED COMPANY
COMSTOCK SEED
ENVIRONMENTALSEED
PRODUCERS
GLOBE SEED COMPANY
GOBLE SEED CO
GOODING SEED COMPANY
GRANITE SEED COMPANY

5380 VIVLAN PLACE
P 0 BOX 16025
1475 W. CENTRAL RD
P 0 BOX 246
3670 ENTERPRISE AVE
8520 WEST 4TH ST
P 0 BOX 2709

ARVADA CO 80002
DENVER CO 80216
EMMETT ID 83617
LEWISTON ID 83501
HAYWARD CA 94545-3222
RENO NV 89523
LOMPOC CA 93438

P 0 BOX 445

TWlN FALLS ID 83303

P 0 BOX 203
P 0 BOX 57
P O BOX 177

GUNNISON UT 84634
GOODING 10 83330
LEHI UT 84043

CONTACT

PHONE

FAX

ED KLEINER
JACK BODGER

(303) 431-6283
(303) 320.7500
(208) 365-3851
(208) 746-3307
(800) 647-6475
(702) 7463681
(800) 558-7664

q02) 746-1701
(805) 735-8798

LARRY MCELLIOTT
BOYD E GOBLE
LARRY SlMlS
DON BERMANT

(208) 733-1373
(801) 528-3234
(800) 743-9580
(801) 768-4422

(208) 733-4484
(801) 52B.7309
(208) 934-8584
(801) 768-3957

DIANEWILSON
TOM VOGES
JIM FRISBEE
SEAN CURRANS

(303) 431-7981
(303) 320-7516
(208) 398-7662
(208) 743-0484

STARS
VENDOR #

84100070201

94223468100

CIN FY 98
BID
N
CM
CM
CM
N
ClN

95148940100

N

82019049400
82846863800

C
C/N

87045977800

CM

C - Grass

X
X

X
X

-

-

-

X

N - Wildflowers

EXHIBIT B

T NO.

EXHIBIT C

BEPORE THEi IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

INRII: RIGHT-OF-WAY
ENCROACHMENT APPLICATION
AND PERMIT FOR JOIIN W. MOODY
AND GARY C. ASM,
Petitioners,
VS.

DAHO DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATlON.
Responcfent.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

ADMMISTRATlVE APPEAL
HEARWG OFFICER'S FlNDMGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AnJD RaCOlWMENDATORY
ORDRR TO THB DIRECTOR
Permit Number: 3-04-348

1

INTRODUCTON
This is an administrative appeal &om final agency wtion by the Idaho Trwl~portation
Dep-ent

(LTTD or "The Department'? denying a variance to the Petitioners for tyro

commercial access approaches from the Estrella Subdivision No. 2 to State Highway 44 in the
City of Star, Ada County, Idallo. ITD concluded, among other grounds, that the application did
not satisfy the requirements of IDAPA 39.03.400.08b,39.03.42.400.04a,39.03.42.300.01,and

39.03.42.300.06.Tlae ITD further concluded that the application for a variance should be denied
because Ule property has multiple approaches lo Pl~unmmRoad and the public right of way to
the North and thus has reasonable access to the proposed development without direct access to
State Highway 44.

Applicants contend the denials are an unreasonable exercise of the police

powers of the State, leaving the subject property with unreasonable access to serve the highest
and best use of the property.

EXHIBIT
P
NO.

An evidentiary hearing was held on June 3,2005 in which the Hearing Offioer received
oral and written fyidence. Following the hearing the rccord was supplemented by stipulation of

/

the parti

ith two items from the City of Star consisting of Ordinance No. 39 dated Mar011 20,

2000 and a Resolution approving a condition modification rcqueet for Estrelln SubdivisionNo. 2

to provide that "Dirffit lot access to State Street ehall be constnrcted ;rs proposed pursuant to
current roadway engineering standarde." Post hearing memoranda were submined to the
Bearing Officer on June 17,2005.
Petitioners have exhausted all of the administrativeand procedural steps end the matter is
properly before the Hearing Officer for a Recommendatory Order to the Director.

11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties agreed that this appeal is a de novo proceeding. The Hearing Oflicer will
apply the same standards that govomed the Department when it denied the application for a

permit and the variance.

xu.
ISSUES
The issue before the Beating Officer is whether to recommaid tn the D i t o r that the
ITD denial of the variance should be revenred and a variance granted.

IV.
FINDINGS 03FACT
1.

State Highway 44 is a two-lane east-west controUcd access facility th~tis

classified as a nual arterial with a posted speed limit of 55 mph. It carries over 17,700 vehicles
per day.
2.

In March of 2002, the ITD Board raclassificd Highway 44 kom 1-84to US 20126

firom Type 111to Type IV access control standards. The Board action was bseed on findings that
the highway was originally constructed as a two-lane rural route with relatively low traffic
volume and little adjacent development; that the use had r~4;callychange4 and it wodd be a
four-lnne facility if not.for fuading constraints; that tho metropolitan planning organization bad
SH-44 modeled as a mdtilane facility for future needs analysis and there were sever4
improvement projects currently pmgmmmed on the mute; md that based on the hction, cwent
iraffrc volume8 and future traffic projections, Highway 44 should be classified 80 Type IV.

3.

Applicants are the owners of Estrella Subdivision No. 2 ("the subdividion" or "the

property"), a ten2 acre cornmenial development of offices and retail uses on the norfhwest
comer of Highway 44 and Plurmner Road intersection in the City of Star, Idnbo. The
subdivision has approximately 635 feet of frontage on Ptummer Road and approximately 645
feet of fmntage on Highway 44.
4.

The City of Star bas a population of less than five thousand inhabitants. The

latest census population for Star. Idaho is 1,795.
5.

The development proposes two full-access driveways onto Highway 44 and tluee

accesses to Plummer Road.

6.

pl-er

ROM is a local street under the jurisdiction of the Ada COW~Y
H~&WQY

District (ACHD).

7.

The Subdivision qualifies under ACHD etandards for multiple approaches off

P l w e r Road and Petitioners have obtained approval from ACHD for W e access points off
Plummer Road.
8.

The subdivision has across access easement with the commmid subdivision to

the west, which has direct access to Highway 44. Petitioners developed the subdivision to the

west.

9.

The Subdivision has no deeded access rights to Highway 44 and ITD Iia issued

no permite for access approaches to Highway 44.
10.

On or about May 11,2004 Applicants applied Sor two commercial approaches for

office and retail uses fiom Estrella Subdivision No. 2 to Highway 44. The ITD denied the
application on the ground the permit applied for does not meet the standarb of the Access
Management Policy because "the approach applied for is closer to the next adjqcmt e r r , a c h
than the minimum nllowable distance of one mile." The Petitioners were informed of their right

to request a d a n c e .
11.

On or about November 4,2004 Applicants applied for n v & n e e to the

Department's access standards contained within the IDAPA Rules. The variance is to put in a
commercial approach, which would have an estimated volme of traffic of 3,886 vehicles per
day. The proposed commercial approael~would be approximately 150 feet Born the intersection
of Highway 44 and Plummer Road. The Deparlment concluded that the proposed approach

would be so close to PI-er

Road that adequate acceleratioddecelerationand center turn lanes

could not be consfmcted to provide a safe wtnmercial approach to the property.
12,

Chief Engitieer's l&er, dated February 24,2005, to Petitioner's representative

stated several gmunds for denying the variance. They include that the approaches do not comply
with IDAPA 39.03.42.400.08b, 39.03.42.400,04a, 39.03.42.300.01, and 39.03.42.300.06. Also,
it was stated that alternative reasonable access is available to the site off Plummar Road and that
under the Department's variance policy a request for variance may not receive favorable
consideration if reasonable alternative access is available. Moreover, the denial stated "this type
of variance on a Type N highway would not s~ippportthe Depment's rule on spacing of accesa
points." Purthermore, the decision letter states the application violates the iutent of IDAPA
39.03.42.300.03, which provides, "Requests for approaches shall be reviewed and masidered for
approval based upon the needs of the totd development regwdess of the needs of individual
psrcels it contains." The Chief Engineer stated: "Your clients could have established cross
access easement, a joint-use approach, or come to the Department with a master plm for both."
13.

The Department's variance policy provides UP& a va&-~ce
will not mceive

favorable consideration if the variance is requested due to a hqrdship created by the landowner or
business, Tlus includes but is not limited to subdivision or partitioning of the property,
conditions created by the proposed building footprint or location or onsite pwkipg or circulation,
or where the access management standards can be met but the results would be higher site
developmmt wsk.
14.

Construction of the proposed approach to Highway 44 will create an unsPIfc

condition for the traveling public on IHigI~way44 and for users of the approach. The approach

would not permit safe vnhicle movement firom or onto Highway 44. Installation of
accelemtion/decelerationtun lanes would not provide for the saFe movement of maffic at the
approach Because of the 55 mile per hour speed on Highway 44 there would be hazardous
conflict betwean vehicles on Highway 44 and vehicles turning into or out of the Subdivision,
even with acceleration/decelerationtun lanes.
15.

The Subdivision has reasonable access through the three approaches to Plummer

Road and over the cross access easement to the property to the west that has access to Highway
44.
16,

The evidence does not support a finding that the ITD W or applied a deliborate

and intentional plan of discrimination against Petitioners in denying the applications for a permit
and a variance.

IV.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

pursuant to Idaho Code 5 40-310(9), which confers powas on the Board to de6i

h

them,as controlled-access facilities and to regulate, restrict or prohibit

access to those h&hwaya to serve the traffic for which the facility is intended
2.

Idaho Code 5 49-202(23), tlie Department must reguMe or prolubit the uBe

of any controlled-access highway by my class or kind of trafiic, which i s found to be
incompatible with the n o d and safe movement of traffic.
3.

Under tI16 Authority of Sections 40-310(9), 40-311(1), 40-311(1), 40312(3), 40-

313(2), and 49-202(19),(23) and (28), and 67-5203,Idaho Code,the Board adopted Rules

Governing Highway Right-of-way Encroachments on State Rights-of-Wgy. D A P A 39, Title
03, Chapter 42.
4.

IDAPA 39.03.42.01 1 provides for Access Control Typos, It provides that accees

control on all segments of tlie State Highway System shall be ypgraded to matoh the most c w m t
fictional classificntion, It create8 five classificationsfor access types, only two ofwhicl)
relevant to this appeal.

a IDAPA 39.03.42.01 1.03, Type IU (Principal Merial). Type 111access control is
applicable to segments of the State Highway System functionally classified #SI principal
arterials. Type IR can also bo applied to selected segments classifi@ 8s minor aitaia1.s
but exhibit charact&stics of phcipal arterials, Pqblic highway connections and new
private iyproachwulsy be pennilted in accordance with Department spring slaodards.
Joint-use approaches are encouraged, As lnnd uses change, existing approaches should
~
dcvclopmcnt of fiontago roads.
be I ~ V ~ G WtoC encourage
D A P A 39.03.42.01 1.04, Type N (Principal Arterial, Multi-Lane, Divided). Type IV
access control is applicable to selected segments of the State Highway System
functionally classified a6 principal arterials and have fow (4) or mow lanee with a median

or continuous center turn lane. Public highway connections and new private npproaches
may bc permitted in accordauce with ~ ~ a r i t n cstandards,
nt
~oint-useappma&es are
encouraged. As land uses change, existing approaches should be reviewed to encourage
development of frontage roads.
5.

D A P A 39.03.400.03(~)provides for minimum distances between approaches and

signals. For Typa UI access in rural areas the intersection spacing is .5 miles, approach spacing
is 1000 foot and s i g d sp~cingie ,S miles. For Type IV access in rural areas, intersaction
spacing is 1 mile and signal spacing ie 1 mile.
6.

Tbe area where Highway 44 abuts the eubjffitproperty is a nual area under the

definition provided in W

A 39.03.42.010.90 because it i s a geogmphical area within the city

limits of Star, which has a population of Ie8ess than five thousand aabitauts,

RUG. 24.2505
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7.

IDAPA 39.03.42.012.100.01 provides in relevant part: "The Deportment shall

retain the authority to iskue all permits on the State Highway System having access control types

I1 through V or where control of access has been a c q W by the Dqrartment."
8.

IDAPA 39.03.42.012.100.04a provides that, "Approaches should be loc8ted as far

as practical from intersections: to preserve visibility at the intersection, to permit safe vehicle
movement, and to accommodate the installation of braMic signs, signals and lighting where
required."
9.

IDAPA 39.03.42.010.06 cbfines an "Approach" as "[a] connection between the

outside edge of the shoulder or curb h e and the W i n g property at the highway right-of-way
tine, intended to provide access to and from said highway and the abutting property. An
approach may include a driveway, alley, street, road or highway."
10.

DAPA 39.03.42.200 governs applications and permits. Sqbpazt 01 req~liresany

individual or business planning to add an a~croachcnton the State highway or use highway
f-way for any purpose other than normal travel, to obtain a permit to use State highway
t-of-way. Encroachment permits approved by the Dqrortnent am required for private and

11.

IDAPA 39.03.42.200.08 provides that all applications for encroachmentp e d s

shall be reviewed and evaluated lor cutrent accoss control requirements, deed reshiotions, safety
and capacity requirements, desip and location standards or an approved variance of these
standards, environmental impacts, location wnflicts, long-range planning goals and the need for
an appraisal.

12.

IDAPA 39.03.42.300 provides the general feylatione far sppro~ches.Subpart 01

provides that aU new or additional approaches requite an ~pprovedState highway right-of-way
pennit and must meet all access control requirements that correspond to the c m n t hctional
classification for the State highway being affected.
300.06 requires that location, design md consl~otionof all
Department idmdards.
14.

IDAPA 39.03.42.300.07 requirts that appmaches be located where tlxey do not

create undue interference with or hazard to the free movement of normal highway traffic, and
where they do not restrict or interfere with the placement or proper function of traffic control
signs, signals, lighting or other devices.
15.

IDAPA 39,03.42.300.09 provides that failure to comply with these reqyirements

may be sufficient cause for the Dcpsltment to deny ao approach application, prohibit specific
approach usage, or remove nn existing approach.
16.

DAPA 39.03.42.400.08b provides that tr~f?icmovements into and out of a

business shall be designed. vhenever possible, to utilize existing local roads. Existing
approaches along traveled way should m e as exits only Erom the busi~esaonto tbe State
highway. Entrance to the property sliould be made from a locs+lmad.
17.

dative authority, in April of2001 the PTD Board adopted

Access Management: SEandarde and Procedures of Highway Riglll-Of-Way Encroachments

YITD Access Manual"), which interpret the IDAPA Rules and Regulation8 governing highway
right-of-way encroachments on State right-of-way.

18.

Section 3.16 of the 1TD Acceas Manual contains a variaoce policy that permits the

Mshict or delegated local highway agency to consider variances when practicable. It provides
that the ITD is to administer requests for vaimces to access managsment standards and policies
through an application and appeals process to ensure statewide consistency. The irutial review of
applications by the District or delegated local highway agency shall include consideration of
Department standards and the practicability of allowing a variance to those standards. Variances
shall not cause a reduction in kafiic safety, operational efficiency, or functional integrity of each
l~ighwayclassification. A more restrictive variance policy is in effect as the level of access
control becomes mote stringent.
19.

The ITD Access Manual, Seation 3.16 provides that a request for a variance may

receive favorable consideration under certain specified conditions. For example, if the vatiance
would improve @a%csafety or opeeations, or would allow access to a landlocked parcel having
no reasonable alternative accees and having no sigarf~cantimpacts to safety or traEc opm~tionf&
20.

The KTD Access Manual, Section 3.16 also provides that a rcqliest for a variance

may not receive favorable consideration under certain specific situations, including if the
variance would negatively impact safety, or would degrade traffic operations of the system, or if
reasonable alternative access ia available, or if the proposed variance does not meet the design
standards of the ITD Design Manual and there are no reasonable grounds h r a design exception.
21.

- If, after consideration of Department standards and variance, application for a

variance is denied, the application may be appealed followingtlae procedure9 outlined in XTD

Access Manual, Section 3.19, Appeals.

22.

The exercise of the police powm to provide for the public safety and welfare,

whicli results in the denial of a vehicle access approach to one's propnfy does not constitute a
cornpensable talring of property under the Idaho or Federal constitutions if the property fronts on
more than one street and the remaining access to the property is rensonable. M ~ W ~ W & ~ E ~ I # ~ ? : S ~ ~

Id&2zE$2,;7+%ei2d:,:39&44$42k:,
23.

The exercise of tile police power to provide for the public safety and welfare,

which advetsely impacts the highest and best use of the property but does not deny the owner the
economicdly beneficial use of the property, does not constitute a compwabie taking of property
under the Ida110 or Federal constitutions. Civof Coeiir d'Alene v. Simpson. 2005 WL286936
..
..

.. . ... . ..

(2005) (citing Penn Central Zkawrp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131,98 S. Ct. at 2662,57 L.Ed,Zd at 652).
24.

Diminution in property value standing done does not establish a cornpensable

taking under tha Idaho or Federal constitutions. City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 2005 WL
286936 (2005 Opinion No. 18) (citing Penn Central lkatrsp. Co., 438 U.S.at 131,98 S. Ct. at
2662,57 L.1Ed2d at 652).
25.

The access Policy Manual imposes on the Depacfment a duty of ordinary care to

protect against a dangerous condition with respect to the granting of approaches to State
Highways. Est~&oak+~.dduha~~~~p~Etf6fi~B~artmeni,
124 Idaho 680,863 P.2d 349
(1992).
26.

The Hearing Officer need not decide whether Ule relevant portion of Highway 44

is clnssified access control Type I11 or Type IV. The Hearing Officer has concluded that Ule
conslruction of a commercial approach to Highway 44 at or within 150 feet of the intersection

-.

with Plummer Road would create a daagerous hazard to the traveling public on Highway 44 and
would violate several standsrda:
a.

It would violate Idaho Code 8 49-202(23), which prohibits the use of any

conbr,llededaccess
highway by any class or kind of trafsc, which is found to be
incompatible with the normal and safe movement of traffic.

b.

It would violate IDAPA 39.03.400.03(~)for Type Ill access in rural areas

where approach spacing must be not less than 1000 feet.
c.

It would violate IDAPA 39.03.42.012.100.04a, which provides that

approaches should be located as far as practical from intersections to permit safe vehicle
movement.
d.

It would violate IDAPA 39.03.42.300.07, which rquires that approaches

be located when, they do not creak undue interference with or hazard to the free
movement of normal highway traffic.

27.

Pursuant to IDAPA 39.03.42.300.09, Ule failure to comply with the requirements

stated above is sufficient cause for the Department to deny the approach application of
Petitioners.

28.

Granting the requested variance to permit construction of the commercial

approach would violate the ITD Access Ma~ualSection 3.16 because the variance would c8we a
reduction in traffic safety and operational emciency of Highway 44,
29.

The requested variance does not satisfy the specified conditions for favorable

consideration under m) Access Manual Section 3.16.

30.

The requested variance may not receive favorable consideration uader ITD

Access Manual Section 3.16 beeawe it would negatively impact safety, would degrade trafftc
operations of the State Highway, reasonable alternative acce88 ie available onto Plummer Road
and through the cross access easement to Highway 44, and the proposed variance does not meet

the design standards of the ITD Design Manual and there are no rewonable grounds for a design
exception.
31.

Gianting the application for the permit or the varinnce to construct the

commercial approach would violate h e duty of the Department to protect against a dangerous
condition with rospect to the granting of approaches to State Highways.
32.

The denial of the applications for the pennit aud the vnrimce do not constitute 8

compe~~~able
taking of Petitioners' property rightp. City of Coeur d'lllene v. Simpson. 2005 WL

286936 (2005 Opinion No. 18) (citing Penn Cenfral12onsp. Co., 438 US, at 131,98 S. Ct. at
2662,57 L.Ed.2d at 652).
33.

The decision cited by Petititoners, Dougiw Counw 11. Briggs, 34 Or App 409,578

P.2d 1261 (1978), does not support ilie Petitionera' claim that the denial of the permit and the
varime constitutes a cornpensable ttlking. %it case w e followed by Douglas County v,

Briggs, 286 Or 151,593 P.2d 1115(1979), which upheld the proposition that the state is required
to compensate a propexty owner if a loss in access to an abutting county highway reduces the
value of the property. That case was decided by the Oregon Supreme Court on the basis of a

stalute that applies to county roads and not to state highways. We are dealing ~ 4 t ha state
highway in this case. In the subsequent decision of SMte of Oregon v. Dupree, 154 Or. App.181

(1998), the Oregon Court of Appeals refused to follow its decision in Dougles County v. Briggs,

staling, "We h v e since held that a reaMction on access to an abutting bigllway imposed for
regulatory purposes related to the we of the highway generally does not result in a cornpensable
taking of access riglits under Atticle I, section 18,of the Oregon Constitution. Tbt means that
the imposition of the restriction does not require compensation to the property owner under Ulnt
provision for any loss in the value of the affffected property," 154 Or. App. clt: 186,n. 3.

34.

The denial of the applications of Petitioners for the permit and the variance do not

constitute a selective enforcement of the law by the 1TD. See, e.g., Yeseo v. Stale ex rel.
Winder, 135 Idaho 804,25P.3d 117 (2001).
35.

Granting the application for the pennit to comtnrct the commercial approwh

would violate the duty of the Department to protect against a dangerous condition with respect to
the granting of approaches to State Righways. See, e.g., Esterbrook v. Idaho lbqwportafion
Department, 124 Idaho 680,863 P.2d 349 (1992).

36.

The variance should be denied.

v.
DECISION
The Bearing Officer recommends to the Director that the hemionce should ba denied.

DATED TIUS 24th day of August, 2005.
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Steven M. Parry
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E. Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, LW
P.O.Box 1583
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VIA FACSIMILE: 386-9428

EXHIBIT D

BEFORE THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN RE: RIGHT-OF-WAY
ENCROACHMENT APPLICATION
AND PERMIT FOR JOHN W. MOODY
AND GARY C. ASIN
Petitioners,
VS.
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.

1
1
)

1
1

1

1
1

FINAL ORDER

)

Permit No. 3-04-348

1
1
1
1

This matter involves a petition for review asking the Director of the Idaho
Transportation Department as the designee of the Idaho Transportation Board to review
the Administrative Appeal Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendatory Order to the Director issued by Hearing Officer Merlyn Clark on
August 25,2005, under Idaho Code 867-5244
In my review of the record I find that substantial evidence exists to support the
findings of fact made by the hearing officer in the recommended order. I do not find the
findings of fact to be clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record in any respect.
Accordingly, I adopt the findings of fact of the hearing officer contained in the
recommended order as my own and incorporate said findings of fact by reference into
this Final Order.
After a thorough review of the record and the law, I further adopt and incorporate
herein the conclusions of law and recommendation contained in the recommendatory
order.
FINAL ORDER - Page 1

EXHIBIT NO.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioners' application
for a variance be denied.
This order is a fmal order and is the final administrative action of the Idaho
Transportation Department, pursuant to Idaho Code 967-527 1. Any party to this
proceeding has the right to judicial review in the district court, pursuant to Idaho Code

DATED this

/

day of December, 2005.

f

DAVID S. EKERN, P.d.
Director

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

13day of December, 2005, I caused a true

and correct copy of the above and within FINAL ORDER to be served to:
E Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

-US.
Mail
H a n d Delivered
Overnight Mail
z ~ e l e c (Fax)
o ~ ~

Steven M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

U.S. Mail
X H a n d Delivered
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Overnight Mail
T e l e c o p y (Fax)

APPENDIX A

This is a r i a l order of the agency. Any party may file a motion for reconsideration of this
final order within fourteen (14) days of the service date of this order. The agency will dispose of
the petition for reconsideration within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, or the petition will be
considered denied by operation of law. See Idaho Code 5 67-5246(4).
Pursuant to Idaho Code $5 67-5270 and 67-5272, any party aggrieved by this final order or
orders previously issued in this case may appeal this final order and all previously issued orders
in this ease to district court by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which a
hearing was held; the final agency action was taken; the party seeking review of the order
resides, or operates its principal place of business in Idaho; or the real property or personal
property that was the subject of the agency action is located.
An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of (a) the service date of this final order,
(b) of an order denying petition for reconsideration, or (c) the failure within twenty-one (21) days
to grant or deny a petition for reconsideration, whichever is later. See Idaho Code 5 67-5273.
The filing of an appeal to district court does not itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement of
the order under appeal.

AM.

BRIAN F. McCOLL, ISB NO. 2192
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701 -1 544
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, LV AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)

1
1
1
1
1
)

IDAI-I0 TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-OC-0616178
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT and MEMORANDUM
P
J SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JLJDGMENT

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is the developer of Lochsa Falls subdivision. The subdivision consists of 254
acres, which was developed into approximately 740 residential lots. The subdivision is located
along Chinden Road between Linder and Ten Mile roads. A preliminary plat of the entire
subdivision was prepared and presented to the City of Meridian for approval in approximately
January of 2003. As part of the preliminary platting process, Becky McKay, the developer's
agent met with and discussed the master plan with the Idaho Transportation Department. At no
time during the preliminary platting process did the Idaho Board of Transportation indicate that a

I

d
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signal would be required where Chinden Rd, and the subdivision's access road intersected, nor
did ITD inform the developer that it would be responsible for the cost of installing the signal.
Idaho Transportation Department rules do make it clear that "all new or additional
approaches, or the modification in design or use, relocation or removal of existing approaches
require an approved state highway right-of-way use permit and shall meet all access control
requirements that correspond to the current functional classification for the state highway being
affected." IDAPA 39.03.42.300.01. The ITD rules also make it clear that there is an application
fee for access permits. The application fee is to be based on the Department's cost to produce
the permit and administer the program. IDAPA 39.03.42.700.01. The rules further provide: "In
addition to the application fee, the Department

require payment of costs associated with the

following: . . . construction of highway modifications or improvements, including but not limited
to signals, illumination, signs, pavement markings, delineation, guardrail and culverts." IDAPA
39.03.42.700.03E.
Plaintiff was not notified that it would be required to install and pay for a traffic signal
until February 24,2005. By this point in time all phases of the subdivision were under
construction or complete (the roads were all in place), and all of the Lochsa Falls lots had been
sold and/or optioned, the only exceptions being lots contained in Phase 12. Therefore, the cost
of installing the signal could not be passed on from the developer to the lot owners.
Lochsa Falls' back was against the wall.

It%~x&m~$g&&~ag~~g~~~~$@~gd~~~&~~

Ye5

unliss it ptiichiied the ITD permit i t the edst.6f appr6x&ately '$180,000.00.. his CC)>I v, as
..

provided under protest.
Afier the bond was provided and construction ofthe signal completed by the Plaintiff's
contractors this lawsuit was initiated to contest the requirement that Lochsa Falls pay for the
construction of the traffic signal.
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F
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Defendant seeks to have this cased dismissed arguing that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies. Defendant argues that Plaintiff should have filed an appeal with the
department's district office prior to initiating this suit.
11.

ARGUMENT
1 he appeal process set out in the Idaho Transportation Department rules allows an appeal
when a permit has been "Denied." IDAPA 39.03.42.003; 39.03.42 200.12. No lnentlon

IS

made

In the rules of appeals protesting "fees".
Defendant has correctly pointed out the general rule that "A person is not entitled to
judicial review of an agency action until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies."
Idaho Code S) 67-5271(1). However, there are exceptions to that rule.
1. ITD Actcd Outside Its Authority
An exception that applies in this case is "where the agency acts outside its authority."
Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900. 903 (1972). This exception is explained further in the
case of Westway Construction Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Department, 139 Idaho 107 (2003).
The case points out that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirelnent only applies
when there is a contested case. The case goes on to state :
The APA governs . . . if [there] is a "contested case," which is defined as a
"proceeding by an agency, other than the public utilities commission or the
industrial commission, that may result in the issuance of an order." IDAHO
CODE $ 67-5240 (2001). . . .
Idaho Code <$ 67-5201(12) defines an order as "an agency action of particular
applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." . . . .
Whether or not that decision determines legal rights, duties, privileges,
immunities or other legal interests requires a two-step analysis.

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOrlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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&TSr,%xhe leglslaf'iiregr~n~~&~~F~gency-th$aQ&~~1t~~&.e_t~-~jg@u&e::iiI~iij~,
&@>$@SE&?. If an agency does not have the authority to resolve a particular
issue, then the agency camlot determine a party's legal rights, duties, privileges,
~mmunities,or other legal interests regarding that issue. Hoppe v. Nichols, 100
lduho 133, 594 P.2d 643 (1979).

5

In this case, the Idaho Transpoflation Department was not acting within the authority

,

w*

granted it by the I.,egislature. The ldaho Constitution Article VII $ 2 provides:
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by
valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of
his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter otherwise provided. The
legislature may also impose a license tax, both upon natural persons and upon
corporations, other than municipal, doing business in this state; also a per capita tax;
provided, the legislature may exempt a limited amount of improvements upon land from
taxation.
There have been cases brought against the State arguing that different feesitaxes are
impermissible under this constitutional provision. The Idaho Supreme Court has found that the
Constitution does not limit the legislature's means of raising revenue to property taxes, license
taxes and per capita taxes. The Constitution does not "prohibit the state from raising revenue
pursuant to its inherent power to do so in any other manner its legislature may see fit to adopt."
Diefendorf v. E.G. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619 (1932). If the Legislature pleases it can impose other
types of taxes, e.g., income taxes and other excise taxes. The Legislature, however, has the sole
power of taxation -all other branches of government must receive a grant of that power from the
Legislature.
The Idaho Transponation Board, which supervises the ldaho Transpoi-tation Department,
has not received a grant of the power of taxation from the Legislature. The Board consists of
seven members that are appointed by the Governor. The powers that have been given to the
Board are contained in Idaho Code $ 40-309 through40-3 17. No mention is made in these code
sections of the power to tax or of the power to impose fees. Interestingly, the 1,egislature has

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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expressly given County Commissioners and Highway District Officers the power to levy taxes to
maintain county and district highways. See Idaho Code $ 40-604(8) and Idaho Code $40-801.
According to the Legislature, state highways are to be constructed and maintained at state
expense. "All costs of constructing, reconstructing and acquiring rights-of-way for highways in
the state highway system shall be born by the state." Idaho Code $ 40-320. Similarly, Idaho
Code $ 40-501, which establishes the Idaho Transportation Department, provides that the
Department has the duty of maintaining the state highways at "state expense." Idaho Code $ 40502. Revenue for these projects is raised from gasoline taxes, special fuel taxes, motor vehicle
fees, and all other moneys as may be provided by law. Idaho Code $ 40-701.
A question is this case is whether the permit fee imposed by the Idaho Transportation
Board and paid by the Plaintiff under protest is a tax. To determine the answer to that question,
this court must apply the following test:
Fees and taxes are generally distinguished in that fees are for the purpose
of regulation whereas taxes are solely for the purposes of raising revenue. See
Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 1 15 Idaho 502, 504-505 (1988). . . . Generally, the
amount of a fee must "bear some relation to the value of the services rendered."
In Chapman, this Court held that a county court's probate fee was
unconstitutional because the probate fee depended only upon the value of the
estate, which had no necessary relation to the value of services rendered." Id,at
634. The Court in Chanman noted that the fee was not "imposed under the police
power for purposes of regulation," suggesting that the holding would be otherwise
if it were. Id.at 635. In Brewster, however, the Court made clear that even
regulations under the police powers must meet a test of reasonableness: "If
municipal regulations are to be held validly enacted under the police power, h n d s
generated thereby must bear some reasonable relationship lo the cost of enforcing
the regulation." 115 Idaho at 504.
It is quite clear that the permit fee in question in the instant case was enacted for the
purpose of raising revenue only, -- first, because by its terms it provides revenue for const~uciion
of a traffic signal, and second, the amount of the fee imposed does not bear a reasonable
relationship to the costs of services rendered by the State to the Plaintiff.
OBJECTION TO DEFENDAN'S'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F
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Accordingly, Plaintiff asks this Court to find that the "fee" Plaintiff was required to pay
was a tax, a tax that was not authorized by the Legislature. Furthermore, Plaintiff asks this Court
to find that since the ldaho Board of Transportation did not have authority to levy this tax, there
is no requirement that Plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing this suit.
2. Justice Requires that the Court Hear This Matter

It would be futile for Plaintiff to appeal to the Idaho Transportation its protest of the
imposition of this fee, as the ldaho Transportation Department is the agency that enacted the rule

-.

that allows the fee. The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically found that futility is a reason to

l.L
fid

forego the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

~c~;~\&.c,

"The rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before the district
c o w will hear a case is a general rule and has been deviated from in some cases."
Fairway Dev., 119 Idaho at 125, 804 P.2d at 298. Specifically, the requirement
will be dispensed with when "the interests of justice so require" or when the
agency has acted outside its authority. Regan, 140 Idaho at 725, 100 P.3d at 619
(citing Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 P.2d 242, 249 (1993); [*I 11
accord Fairway Dev., 119 Idaho at 125, 804 P.2d at 298; Grever v. Idaho Tel.
Co., 94 Idaho 900, 903, 499 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1972). Styled differently, courts
will not require exhaustion "when cxhaustion will involve irreparable injury and
when the agency is palpably without jurisdiction." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata,
99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978); see also Regan, 140 Idaho at
726, I00 P. 3d at 620; Fairway Dev., I1 9 Idaho at 125, 804 P. 2d at 298. . . .

The Property Owners claim that the interests of justice required immediate
judicial intervention. Typically this situation occurs where irreparable harm
results from the administrative process itself. See SiErra Lib, 99 Idaho ant 629,
586 P.2d a1 1073 (excusing failure to exhaust where the subject matter of the
action involved alleged proposed unlawful action by the agency that would cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiff); Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129,
135, 106 P.3d 455, 461 (2005) (recognizing an exception to the exhaustion
requirement "where bias or prejudgment by the decision maker can be
demonstrated" because due process entitles a person to an impartial tribunal and
requiring exhaustion before a biased decision maker would be futile). The
standard may also be satisfied by showing that the agency lacks power to grant
the requested relief, i.e., that exhaustion would be futile.

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and MEMOKANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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The Department would clearly be biased in favor of upholding the fee and would
most assuredly, given its admitted pattern of always imposing these fees on developers,
uphold the imposition of the same. Reversing that position could be quite costly for the
Department, as the Department's Chief Engineer has testified: "To my knowledge the
Idaho Transportation Department has never paid in full or in part for any highway
improvements or traffic control devices associated with a property owner's Right of Way
Encroachment Application for an Approach to a State Highway." Affidavit of Steven C.
It-lutchinson In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court hold that the interests of justice
dictate that exhaustion of remedies is not required in this matter.
111.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court not
dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

a

uC

DATED this

day of January, 2007.
WILSON & McCOL12
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day of January 2007, a true and correct copy of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Steven J. Schuster
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

-by regular U.S. Mail
-by Facsimile
by I-land Delivery
-by Overnight Mail
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BRIAN F. McCOLL, ISB NO. 2192
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420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
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e : 345-91 00
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)

1
Plaintiff,

)
)

1

vs.

1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

1

Case No. CV-OC-0616178
AFFlDAVT OF JUSTIN MARTIN
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

Defendant.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, )
County of Ada.

: SS.
)

I, JUSTIN MARTIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am a project manager of Lochsa Falls, L.L.C., the Plaintiff in this matter, and I make

this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and belief:
2. Lachsa Falls, L.L.C. is the developer of Lochsa Falls Subdivision. The subdivision

consists of 254 acres, which was developed into approximately 740 residential lots.
The subdivision is located along Chinden Road between Linder and Ten Mile roads,
within the city of Meridian.

1

.

m . 7 .

xrvr

m c r r IOWXI xnaarihi

IN0PPnSlTlON TO DEFENDANT'S

MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

3. A preliminary plat of the entire subdivision was prepared and presented to the City of
Meridian for approval in approximately January of 2003. A true and wtrrect copy of
the preliminary plat is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
4. As part of the preliminary platting process, Becky Mclcay, a representative of Lochsa
Falls, L.L.C., met with and discussed the master plan with the Idaho Transportation
Department (''ITW).

At no time during the preliminary platting process did ITD

indicate it would require a signal where Chinden Rd. and the subdivision's access
road intersected, nor did I'TD inform Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. that it would be responsible

Ibr the cost of installing the signal.
5. After a subdivision receives preliminary plat approval from Meridian, the developer

has the option of constructing the subdivision in phases. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. utilized
this phase development process for the Lochsa Falls Subdivision. After obtaining
construction plan approval and final plat approval from the City of Meridian for each
of the first I I phases, Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. proceeded to obtain construction plan
approval and final plat approval for Phase 12. The City of Meridian approved the
construction plans and final plat for Phase 12, Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. bonded for the
improvements, commenced construction and circulated the final plat for agency
signatures.
6. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. was not notified that it would be required to install and pay for a

traffic signal until February 24, 2005.

By this point in time all phases of the

subdivision were under construction or complete.

All of the roads had been

completed and/or were in place. At this point in time all of the Lochsa Falls lots had
been sold and/or optioned, the only exceptions being the 116 lots contained in Phase

00084

-
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12. Therefore, the cost of installing the signal could not be passed on from Lochsa

Falls, L.L.C. to the lot owners.
this late dale, after obtaining all approvals, the City of Meridian indicated that
ilding permits would not be issued until Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. complied with ITD'
gnal repayment requirement. 1 felt at that point in time that Lochsa Falls, L.L.
had no other choice but to purchase the ITD permit at the cost of approximatel
$180,000.00. This condition that 1,ochsa Falls, L.L.C. construct and pay for th
signal was met under protest. A copy of the letter from Lochsa Falls, L.L.C.'s
attorney to the Idaho Transportation Department protesting the fee is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B.
DATED this -$day

of January 2007.

--

WORN :t before me t h i s d 3 day of January 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
n

n

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the&
day of January 2007, a true and correct copy of
the u~ithinand foregoing document was served upon:

Steven J. Schuster
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 1 1 West State Street
Boise. Idaho 83707-1 129

-by regular U.S. Mail
by Facsimile
by Hand Delivery
by Overnight Mail

-

-
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WILSON& McCo~r;
LAWYERS
jen@wnsonmoooil.mrn

4 2 0 WEST WMHINOTON
POST OFFICE BOX 1544

BRIAN r: MECOU

BOISE, IDAHO 8 3 7 0 2

JEFFREY MI WILSON

bhan@wi(sonmccon.wrn
LISA 5. RASHUSSEN
iisa@wil~smcMll.mm

TELEPHONE: (208)
345.9100
FACSIMILE: (208)384-2442

March 10.2005

Chris Canfieid, P.E.
Idaho Transportation Department
District 3, P.O. Box 8028
Boise, Idaho 83707-2028

RE: Permit Application No. 3-05-042; US-20-26 Lochsa Falls, L.L.C.
Dear Mr. Canfield:
Enclosed is the letter of credit required by the District in connection with the referenced
permit. I wanted the file to reflect that submitting this letter of credit does not constitute a
waiver of any claim Lochsa may have against the adjoining Silver Leaf Subdivision for
contribution; nor to Lochsa's rights to question the District's authority to require Lochsa to pay
for the traffic signal in question.
Yours sincerely,

BFM/rc
Enclosure
cc.

Lochsa Falls, L.L.C.
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LAWREN& G: WASDEN
ATTORNEY GErnRAL
STEWEN J. SCfIUSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho TransportationDepartment
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
FacsimiIe: (208)334-4498
ISB #3453

Counsel for Plaintiff.
..

,

.

n\r THE DXST£UCT COVRT-OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
I
I

OF THE STATE
INAND FOR'THE COW
. . OF IDAHO,

LoCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho W t e d
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I

)
)

j
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)
)
)
)
)

-VS-

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATIONBOARD,
.

.
.

.
.

OF ADA

.

.

CASE NO. CV-OC-0616178
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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINlSTRATm
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J

Defendant.

.

.

:I,

. .

.

.

The Idaho ~raas~ortation
Department issued a peMt to the Plaintiff*Loohsa Falls, to use
,me

of. my,
.
property fcr the de~clopmentof its 254 m a subdivision. ~ o o b r aF&
'
aRer
,

obtaining the permit filed this oligind action chall&g

certaia coiditions ITD placed.on the

permit. The conqiions &'solely ielated to highway safety issues, ITD moved for S&W
!

I

Jud&nent for Lochsa Palls failure to exhaust its remedies.

-.

.

.
.

.

!
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.

,

Lochsa Falls, in its response, for the h t time discloses-thatpriorio' obtaining the permit
.

.

.from

m'Za use and occupy the state pmprty for its private development, it haci filed and

.

.'

recorded both preliminary and final plats showing the use of ITD property. See: gxbibit A of the

Marlin Affidavit. In o&er words, LOchsa Falls filed a Trnal plat on ITD property for which it had
no legal right to occupy.

,

.

Mr. Mari+Ps Ah6davit goes on to provide that by the time it had o b ~ e the
d permit from

ITD,

",

...all phases of the mbdivisiqn w

e 'under construction or complete..

... all of the lois
. .

bad been soId d o r optioned, the only exceptions being the 116 1ots.co'ntained in Phase 12.",
.

,

..

'

Martin Affidavit -paragraph6. Presnmably some .of .the p ~ ~ h a s e k 'the
p f lots d i e d on the final

'

plat showing the beneficial use of the state properly for which even today ~ o c h s Palls
a
only has..
.

. .

.

a temporary access permitt

. .

.

.

Lochsa Falls theory of developing property with the use of state property mu afoul of
Idaho law. F& ITD is nit involved in the Plamhg and Zqning process. Idaho 'Code section
.

,

67-6528 pmvide'in part, "The provisions of

plans' and ordinanc& enacted pwsuant to this
.

.

chapter shalt not apply to transportation
systems of statewide importance qs may be d e k i n e d ,
, .

.

,

''

.

.

.

by the Idaho Transportation Boa.." US Highway 20/26 (C!hinden)is d'&ned as a p p o r t a t i o n
.

,

.

system of ,state+& importance. IDAPA 39.03.48 "Routes exempt &om Local Plans &d
.

,

0rdj.PancesY.
..

or plat ippmval'giveh by the .City would have no effect pri ~ o c h sFalls
i

Any Zo*

applioation to use State &Sighway Right of Way for its private deveIopment. This concept of
.
.
.

.

&d Zoning Law is further c l d e d with respect to the lxansportation component

'~dahoPl.

.

.
.

,

.

.

.

.
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.
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.

,

.

.

..

of ~ o m ~ r e b e n splans.
i ~ e Idaha (lode section 67-6S08(i) provides &a%, ?local jurisdi~tion(s)

."

having authority over public highways and streets.. shalI make recommendations.
ITD is Gt involved in the pkil~hpprocess. Idaho Code Section 50-1313 makes it clear

tbat platting ofpubli&streets only involves a City or Highway District and IT'D'S process under
.

.

the IDAPA rulg of granting the temporary acceis .permit and then cordimhg it with deeded
access 'is the exclusive method of obtskdng access to a Stati Highway.
:

.

Lochsa $ails did fiat create my hbperty rights in the proposed approach.to US HighWy

Lochsa i;'alls,*

its oonsultants; ~ & ~ s E n g i n e + , Washington Grolip, and becky

MeKay, would ~resumptivtilyknow ITD's access reqeements. M&

ABdavit,Pmagraph 4,

and Exhibit A. The ID&A standardsare:

:

1) ~e&estsfor developbent shall be reyitWed and considered for ~pprovdbased
on the needs ofthe total development, regardless of the number of parcels it contains.
. .

IDAPA 39.03.42.300.02

. .

2) Desiga approaches for c k e n t and future property access rec@irements..

.

.

.

IDAeA 39.03.42.400.02.a

The point being is that ILOchsa Falls should have obtained its permit at the time Phase 1 was
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.

One fwt&r portion of the JDAPA rule is worth mentioning. "If the permitted work,i s not

..

completed '&thin one (1) year -ofpennit issuance, the permit is void At the discretion ofthe
six months may be granted...'' ,D&A

Departmelit, a onetime extension not to ex-d
.

.',

'

'

.

39.03.42.201.03. The permit was issued to Lwhsa Palli h ~ovemliero f 2004 and the workby W h s a Palls has not been accepted by the Department. Hutchinson -dad<
,

,

.

paragraph 6. Th= rule goes on to Provide that the property ownkr/deve;loper must s u b i t a new
application..

.

..

.

.

.

.

577,
. . 67 .P.jd56 (2003)

,

.
.
2d;.+#?h;;p?F.;:z:
(D@E?a$@?Q$.'i'.2U06).
z:s&@F332 938G;2
L?- .*,.<

,
?: ,.<.,>z,
7*:
,

,

,

Two casis
this C o d h&d and decided deser\ie keati&
*

.---.*,--

In KMST this'Court

6%

,.-,
"W
&A--'

.-.I*-

- ..

quoted by the Supreme Corn witfi the

. .

developmed,application referenced in KMST can 'very easily lurn into the JDAPA

tempo&

access permit.,

Two
. items on KMST are distinguishable. In KMST,
,

.

,

&m.arps*ik~{G$;x$s5,~F::">9t~~~
::>,*%; :>;>, :,>,,
~ ~ # ~ ~ @ j & ~ g ~ ~ i i

The district court found %at as a general matter developem do not included
conditiogs in development applications if they disagree with the conditions!'
The district wurt also found, UKMST representatives included the
c o ~ . t i o nand dedication of Bird Stmet in the application because they
were concerned that failing to do so would delay closing on the property."
KMST's property was not taken. It volmtarily decided to dedicate the road
to the public in order to sped the approval of its development.

i he

.

tbe developer objehd td the
, ,

.

.

decision makers: but i&iuded the disputed issues,in
. . its application. In.the&stant.case, the State

.

Official charged with makidg the decision did not become aware of the dispute until litigation
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was filed. Hutobiuson Aflidavit, pmgraph 12. W S T , also dealt with a local mads where the

..

Pladaing and Zqniqg process plays a vital role as oompared to a state high%y;
The seoond.refereriOed case, Park v. Ban&

2006 WL 3741111 (December 21,2006),

is a recent Idaho Supreme Court deoisiop that is still in

but d&izively .holds that in

situations such as this, &I aggrieved party must exhapt its remedies. In addressing the exception
to the exhaustion rule of the agency acting outside of its authority the Supreme Court reafEmed
.

.

the test of, '"...%hen the agency is palpably .'&thout jiuisdiction."

In the instant case, Plaintiff is clajming thaf some but not all of the impmvements, it was
required to construct as a condition of the mcroachment permit -a&jnvalid. As & example, the
paving and striping of.the State Highway for the a p p a c h are expenses of the Pl&t&Xfor which
..

there is n o ' c ~ e n ~ This
e . is a dispute that falls witbin-thejurisdiction of the Department. TO
. .

.

hold othenvise- wouid declare that every rSD encroaohment permit issued that required the
developer to.install a tmEe signal'to be "'absolutely void."

. .

.

.
.

,

.

.

The 'second part of the Park decision is that the Court required the aggrieved parties to.
exhaust their remedies even though the original decision maker lacked the authority to grant the
relief sought. Xn this case, the requirement for the developer to pay for the ttaftio signal to

mitigate the .impact its,development will haveon the State system is a pemiisive requhment
of costs associated with

(i.e. "...the Repartment may require

39;03.42.700.03.e. 'Ibis is a situation where
.

....signals."

.IDAPA

the origitlal decision maker has the auth&ty

to

,

decide tkatthe Loehsa Falls intersection does not need a & 4 c signal.
Clkarly the Park decision mandat6s that D4kndants Motion for Summary'Judgment be
granted.
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CONCLUSION

1

TTD has moved Esr Summary Judgment based on L o c k Falls' failure to exhaust its
Falls created the problem when it failed to obtain a permit to

administrative remedies. Lo&

encroach on the State Highway until Phase 12 of its twelve phase development. Loohsa Falls
created its own problem and should not be rewwded by creating the problem. M'D is entitled to
Summary Judgment dismissing fhe Complaint without prejudice.
. .

.

.

Dated tl$s 30' ,&iyof January, 2007.
.
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STEVEN M.PARRY
Deputy Attorney.Gen
Idaho Transportation Department
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~~F-THE-~'~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD
Case No. CVOC 0616

LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an ldaho limited
liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Lisa Rasmussen of Wilson, McColl & Rasmussen for
Lochsa Falls, LLC
For Defendant: Steven M. Parry of the ldaho Attorney General's
Office for the State of ldaho, ldaho Transportation Board

I
1

PROCEEDINGS

This matter came before the Court on February 6, 2007, upon the Defendant's

//Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice.

I

Following oral argument by counsel the Court took the matter under advisement.

/I

I1

1
1

BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of an encroachment permit fee imposed upon Lochsa

Faib, LLC. ("Lochsa Falls") by the ldaho Transportation Department ("ITD"). Lochsa

Falls is the developer of a subdivision in Meridian, Idaho The plat that was approved
by the City of Meridian called for an internal collector street to intersect with Chinden
Boulevard. Because Chinden Boulevard is a state highway, Lochsa Falls was required

I

-

-
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I11

to obtain an encroachment permit from ITD. The ITD conditioned receipt of Lochsa

1

2

Falls' permit upon, among other things. the construction of a traffic signal at the

I

expense of Lochsa Falls.

5

I/
II

Lochsa Falls contests the assessment of ihe installation of the traffic signal and

initiated this litigation on August 30, 2006, filing a Complaint wherein Lochsa Falls

llasserts claims for (1) disguised and unconstitutional tax, (2) taking without just

' Ilcompensation, and (3) violation of substantive due process and equal protection of the
//law. The ldaho Transportation Board responded on November 22, 2006, by submitting
9

an Answer. Subsequently, on December 27, 2006, the ldaho Transportation Board
10

filed its present Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint without
11

Prejudice.

12

LEGAL STANDARD

13
14

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that summary judgment shall be

15

rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the

l6
l7

1

11

affidavits, if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment may be

l8 //rendered upon an entire case or discrete claims or issues. See I.R.C.P. 56(d). To
19

defeat a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party may not simply rely upon
20

IImere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts in an affidavit
21

22
23

1

presenting a genuine issue of fact for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Rhodehouse v, Sfutts, 125

1
/I

ldaho 208, 21 1, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). On a motion for summary judgment, all

facts and inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v.

24
25
26

11

Hollingsworth, M.D. eta/., 136 ldaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001).

-
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I
1
11
I1
1
1

DISCUSSION

The Defendant argued the undisputed facts in this case show that the Plaintiff
has failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and this warrants dismissal of the
Plaintiff's claims without prejudice.

According to the Defendant, "the appropriate

remedy for a real estate developer dissatisfied with a condition of a Right-of-way
Permit is contained in the ldaho Administrative Procedures Act is to file for a contested

case hearing with the agency." Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p.2.

IlThe Defendant asserted the case law in ldaho supports the argument that the ldaho
9

Supreme Court is embracing the exhaustion doctrine and thereby requiring Plaintiffs to
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fully exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in a court of law.
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In this case, the Plaintiff applied with the ITD for a permit to build a new street

connecting to US Highway 20126 (Chinden Blvd.). This application process is governed

ibllby
I

IDAPA

39.03.42.

RULES

GOVERNING

HIGHWAY

RIGHT-OF-WAY

ENCROACHMENTS ON STATE RIGHTS OF WAY. Pursuant to IDAPA 39.03.42.700
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APPLICATION FEES, IDT placed certain conditions upon the approval of the Plaintiff's
application. One of these conditions was the construction of the traffic signal at the new

l8
llintersection

connecting the Lochsa Falls subdivision with Chinden Blvd.

IDAPA

39.03.42.700 states in relevant part:
01. Fee Administration. Fees for applications for permits shall be based
on the Department's cost to produce the permit and administer the
program. Fees for permits are not refundable in the event of denial of the
permit or in the event the permittee fails to comply with the permit.
Applications shall not be processed until all applicable permit fees are
received.

03. Miscellaneous Costs. In addition to the application fee, the
Department may require payment of costs associated with the following:
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a. Study or appraisal review; or
b. Appraisal fees required to establish the value of property for
new, additional, modification in design or use, or relocation of
approaches or other encroachments in a controlled access
highway.
c. Inspection fees may be charged at the discretion of the District
Engineer when substantial inspection time will be required to
monitor and accept work done within the right-of-way. This includes
wages, travel, subsistence and other expenses incurred. The intent
is to recover only Department costs. When the inspection fee is to
be assessed, it shall be stipulated under the application's special
provisions. Travel time in excess of one (1) hour, a loaded payroll
rate, vehicle rental cost, subsistence and other expenses incurred.
If additional inspections are required, the permittee will be billed a
flat fee as determined by the Department at the time the permit is
issued.
d. A performance bond may be required of an applicant at the
discretion of the Department. The purpose of this bond is to
guarantee completion of the work in accordance with the
requirements of the permit. The bond amount should be large
enough to cover costs to correct potential damage that might be
caused by the permittee. The bond shall be executed by a surety
comwanv authorized to conduct business in Idaho.
e. construction of hiahwav modifications or improvements,
includina but not limited to siqnals, illumination. siqns,
pavement markinas. delineation, guardrail and culverts;
f. Changes or adiustments made to highway features or f~xtures;or
g. ~ x ~ i n s erelating
s
to photocopyi~highway plans, permits or
related documents.
(emphasis added).
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01. Commencement. Applicants may appeal denied permits in writing to
the Department's District Traffic office within thirty (30) days of receipt of
notification. The appeal process commences on the date the
Department's District office receives notification of appeal from the
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applicant.
02. Process Hold. If at any time during the appeal process it is
determined that insufficient documentation was submitted with the appeal,
all parties shall be notified that the appeal process is placed on hold until
the necessary documentation is supplied.
03. Initial Appeal Process. The District will have fourteen (14) working
days to review the appeal. If the District does not overturn the original
denial, the appeal shall be forwarded to the State Traffic Engineer who will
have fourteen (14) working days to review and prepare it for review by the
Department's Chief Engineer. The Department's Chief Engineer will have
fourteen (14) working days to review the appeal. The appellant shall be
notified by certified mail within seven (7) working days of the Department's
Chief Engineer's decision.
04. Secondary Appeal Process. If further arbitration is required, the
appellant has thirty (30) days following denial notification to contact the
Department's legal section and the appeal process will be initiated in
accordance with the ldaho Administrative Procedure Act and IDAPA
04.11.01, "ldaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney
General".

I1
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IDAPA 39.03.42.003. "This is the forum ITD believes Plaintiff is required to use, if it

wishes to contest the condition of the permit.'' Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment, p.6. Furthermore. the Defendant pointed out that ldaho Code Section 675271(1) states, ?a] person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency action until that
person has exhausted all administrative remedies required in this chapter."
The Administrative Procedures Act governs if an agency's decision is a

"contested caie.'' Westway Constr.. Inc v. ldaho Transp. Dept., 139 ldaho 107, 111,
73 P.3d 721,725 (2003). A 'tontested case" is defined as a "proceeding by an agency.

1

other than the public utilities commission or the industrial commission, that may result in

11 the issuance of an order."

I.C.

5 67-5240.

The parties in this case do not dispute that

I

the ITD is an agency. But to be a contested case, the proceeding must be one that

I
11

may result in the issuance of an "order." An "order" is defined as "an agency action of

particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or

-
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other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." I.C. $ 67-5201(12).
Whether or not that decision by an agency determines legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities or other legal interests requires a two-step analysis. Westway
Constr., Inc., 139 ldaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. "First, has the legislature granted the
agency the authority to determine the particular issue?" Id. "Second, does the agency
decision on the issue determine the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities; or other
legal interests of one or more persons?" Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The Defendant argued that it "is clear that ITD has the authority to determine if
and how real estate developers will access controlled access to highways on the state
system."

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p.8.

The Defendant

'

maintained ldaho Code Sections 40-310(9) and 49-202(23) & (24) establish that the
legislature granted the agency the authority to issue the encroachment permit at issue.
To the contrary, the Plaintiff argued "the [ITD] was not acting within the authority
granted by the Legislature." Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4. The
Plaintiff asserted even though the general rule suggests a party must exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts, the ldaho Supreme Court
has recognized exceptions to this general rule: "(a) when the interests of justice so
require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its authority." KMST, LLC. v. County of

I

ldaho Codes Section 40-31O(9)states the ldaho Transportation Board shall "[djesignate state highways,
l r parts of them, as controlled-accessfacilities and regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways
o serve the traffic for which the facility is intended."
daho Codes Section 49-202(23)states the ldaho Transportation Board "shall regulate or prohibit the use
)f any controlled-access highway by any class or kind of traffic which is found to be incompatible with the
lormal and safe movement of traffic."
daho Codes Section 49-202(24)states the ldaho Transportation Board "shall erect and maintain traffic:ontrol devices on controlled-access highways on which any prohibitions are applicable."

-

-
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11854 P.2d 242 (1993)). Citing Article Vll

3

2 of the ldaho ~ o n s t i t u l o nthe
~ Plaintiff

argued the legislature has the sole power of taxation and since the ldaho

1

Transportation Board, which supervises the ITD, has not received a grant of power of
taxation from the Legislature, the cost of the traffic light in this case is an inappropriate
. .
. the'Courtbecoriles,
. .
and an unconstitutional tax. In other.words, the question before
.

1

. .. .. ..

.

.

..

whether the-permit fee imposed by the (TD and paid by the Plaintiff is a tax or a fee.
The Plaintiff argued the permit fee imposed in this case is a tax because the expense is

I

solely for the purposes of raising revenue and bears no relation to the value of the

((servicesrendered.

(11

The ldaho Supreme Court, in discussing a municipal fee. has stated "a fee is a
charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is

//forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs." Brewster v. City of
Pocatello, 115 ldaho 502, 505, 768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988). Moreover, "fees must be

//

rationally related to the cod of enforcing the regulation and cannot be assessed purely

1
1

as a revenue-generating scheme.'' Poffs Consfr. Co.

v. North Kootenai Water Dist., 141

ldaho 678.681, 116 P.34 8. 11 (2005).

11

Contrary to the Plaintiff's argument, the Court will find, premised upon the record
currently before the Court, that the permit fee in this case is neither unreasonable nor

The ldaho Constitution Article VII 3 2 provides:
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by
valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of
his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter otherwise provided. The
legislature may also impose a license tax, both upon natural persons and upon
corporations, other than municipal, doing business in this state; also a per capita tax:
provided, the legislature may exempt a limited amount of improvements upon land from
taxation.
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arbitrary. The encroachment permit fee assessed to Lochsa Falls is reasonable and
,ationally related to the purpose of the Idaho Transportation Board's function of insuring
7ormal and safe movement of traffic on controlled-access highways. The permit fee in
:his case cannot be viewed as a contribution by the public at large to meet public
~eeds. Rather, the amount of the fee was directly related to the safe access of
3hinden Boulevard to the developer in this case and those who purchased lotslhomes
irom the developer. As. such, the permit fee in this case is a fee and thus the Coutt will
-. .. ..

.

. .. .. ..

- .

.

.

. .

. .

'ind theDefendant in this case was acting within its authority granted by the Legislature.
.
. . .. . . . The Plaintiff also argued the interests of justice require the Court to hear the
Plaintiff's claims at this time and not require the Plaintiff to exhaust its administrative
,emedies. The Plaintiff contended an administrative appeal makes no sense to argue
;.onstitutional law issues. The Plaintiff reasoned that this Court is the proper venue to
3ddress the Plaintiff's claims and appealing the agency decision to the agency itself
~ o u l dbe futile.

However, the Court is unpersuaded and unable to find that the

nterests of justice require that the exception to the general rule be applied in this case.

Although the Plaintiff raises constitutional challenges before this Court, the

should not be required

-

is benefiting other

-

IEMORANDUM DECISION CASE NO. CVOC0616178 PAGE 8

003.01'

1

seeking any form of relief in this Court. The interests of justice simply do not warrant an

((exceptionto the general rule in this case.
Moreover, the Court will find the decision by ITD to impose the miscellaneous
cost of the traffic signal does determine the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities,
or other legal interests of one or more persons. The imposed cost of the traffic signal,
being $176,986.00, is a legal interest of the Plaintiff's. As a result, the APA presently
governs this dispute between these parties. Also, there is no evidence of irreparable

/I

injury or that the Idaho Transportation Board lacks the authority to grant the requested

relief, i.e. the waiver of the permit fee. And finally, the inte.r~tss~Ef;.jus~se=do~ot~waccant

re~ie~~~gL~s~~~ain~$~.fr~~~e~~a~s~~n-9;~it~~~admi~is~~~t~~~

CONCLUSION

//1

For the reasons stated above there is no genuine issue of material fact and this
issue is a question of law and appropriate for summary judgment. The Court finds the

II~dministrativeProcedures Act is the proper procedure and the Plaintiff has not
//exhausted those procedures and therefore the Court will GRANT the Defendant's

1
11

Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice. The
Defendant will prepare an order in compliance with this Memorandum Decision.
DATED this

7
day of February 2007.
DISTRICT JUDGE

11

-

-

MEMORANDUM DECISION CASE NO. CVOC0616178 PAGE 9

J
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1
2

I hereby certify that on the
3
4
5
6

2

day of February 2007, 1 mailed (sewed) a true

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Steven M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. BOX7129
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Ada County Clerk
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #2153
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)

Plaintiff,

1
1
)
)

-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-OC-0616178
JVDGMENT

1
)

1

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice, the Court found that there are
no material issues of fact in dispute and that the Defendant as a matter of law is entitled to
Judgment.

JUDGMENT - Page 1

NOW TKEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

I

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

$0

day of February, 2007, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Brian F. McColl
Wilson, McColl, & Rasmussen
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise ID 83701-1544

mU.S. Mail
[ r l ~ a n dDelivered
movernight Mail
[ I 1 ~ e l e c o(Fax)
~ ~ 384-0442

STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129

mU.S. Mail
n H a n d Delivered
n0vernight Mail
n ~ e l e c (Fax)
o ~ ~334-4498

Court Clerk
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BRIAN F. McCOLL, ISB NO. 2192
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701-1 544
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,

1
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-0616178

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

VS.

)

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.

TO:

1
1

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, STEVEN M.
PARRY, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, P.O. BOX 7129, BOISE, ID 83707-1 129,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named appellant, Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. appeals against the above named
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint
without Prejudice, entered in the above entitled action on the 7th day of February,
2007, Honorable Judge Michael McLaughlin presiding.

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 1

.
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or
orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule I1 (a)(l).
3. The issues on appeal are as follows:

(a) Whether the District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint finding
that it was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit in
District Court;
(b) Whether the District Court correctly found that the Idaho Transportation
Board had authority to require Plaintiff to pay all costs associated with the
construction of a traffic signal on Chinden Boulevard.
4. There has not been an order entered sealing any portion of the record.

5. A reporter's transcript is not requested.
6. The appellant requests that the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
(a) Affidavit of Steven C. Hutchinson in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment;
(b) Memorandum in Supporl of Motion for Summary Judgment;
(c) Motion for Summary Judgment;
(d) Affidavit of Justin Martin in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment;
(e) Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

(f) Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of the notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because

a transcript has not been requested.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho Rule

DATED thiaJ

/c4

day of March, 2007.
WILSON & McCOLL

~ t t o s e for
~ sPlaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the&
day of March 2007, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing document was served upon:
Steven J. Schuster
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Tamara Hohenleitner
Court Reporter
c/o Judge Michael Mclaughlin
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

b

__by

by regular U.S. Mail
y Facsimile
by Hand Delivery
by Overnight Mail
by regular U.S. Mail
Facsimile
by Hand Delivery
by Overnight Mail

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
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LOCHSA FALLS, L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
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I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the ~ i s k i cCourt
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of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 3rd day of April, 2007.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
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I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each ofthe Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
BRIAN F. McCOLL

L A W N C E G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 21st day of March,

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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